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INTRODUCTION
Sufficient time has passed since the National Labor Relations
Board asserted jurisdiction over colleges and universities in 1970 to
make it clear that no other single representation field has spawned as
much controversy in so short a time, and has left as many unanswered
questions. It is the purpose of this article to review the Board's activity
in the area, to comment on precedent, and to raise a number of ques-
tions about past and potential Board action so that those just coming
into contact with the field of university bargaining will be, if not well
armed, at least aware.
Basic among such questions will be the issue of the extent to
which the Board should decline to exercise jurisdiction because an in-
stitution has a public or quasi-public character. Two recent decisions
of the Board suggest that it shall interpret very narrowly strictures
upon jurisdictional assertion contained in extant legislation. A second
issue that will be examined is the justification for the Board's depar-
ture in its faculty decisions from the established precedent of includ-
ing regular pãrt-time employees with regular full-time employees in
one overall bargaining unit. The implications of that departure will
be discussed particularly with respect to fragmentation of those per-
sons with similar teaching interests into potentially competitive units.
Another question that will be addressed is the propriety of including
department chairmen in faculty voting units because the department
"shares authority" with the chairmen in personnel decisional areas.
Ultimately, the question that will be raised is whether the Board, in
including department chairman in full-time faculty units, has placed
too much emphasis on a chairman's managerial style and his self-
determined grant of authority to departmental members. Other im-
portant questions considered will include the scope of the bargaining
unit, special collective bargaining issues in higher education, and the
significant impact of the Board's doctrine of exclusive representation
on traditional collegial governance forms.
I. JURISDICTION
The nation's institutions of higher learning remained immune
from the impact and influence of the National Labor Relations Act'
for thirty-five years. The decision that colleges and universities fell
outside the ambit of the jurisdiction conferred under the Act was ini-
tially made by the National Labor Relations Board in 1951 in Trustees
of Columbia University.2 There, the Board, while finding that the Uni-
*Partner, Morgan, Brown, Kearns, 8c Joy, Boston, Massachusetts. B.S., College of
the Holy Cross, 1960; LL.B. Boston College Law School, 1965. I wish to gratefully ac-
knowledge the assistance of my friend and associate, Philip J. Moss, in the preparation
of this Article.
' 29 U.S.C. I 151 et seq. [hereinafter the Act).
' 97 N.L.R.B. 424,29 L.R.R.M. 1098 (1951).
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versity satisfied the requirements of the Act in terms of its effect on
interstate commerce ,a nevertheless held that non-profit organizations
were intended to be within its jurisdiction "only in exceptional circum-
stances and in connection with purely commercial activities of such
organizations."' Based on this interpretation of the Act, the Board
continued for nearly two decades to decline jurisdiction over institu-
tions of higher learning. 5 During this period, however, the nation ex-
perienced a tremendous growth in institutions of higher education , 6
which had a "massive impact" on interstate commerce. Faced with
these factors, and following a re-examination of the legislative history
of non-profit organizations, the Board in Cornell University' specifically
overturned Columbia and asserted jurisdiction over private colleges
and universities. 5
3 Section 159(c)(I) of the Act confers on the Board the jurisdiction to conduct
hearings involving the certification or decertification of bargaining units if after exam-
ining the petition, the Board determines "that a question of representation affecting
commerce exists." The term "commerce" is defined in section 152(6) and (7) of the Act
to mean "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several
states ...."
In determining whether the employer is sufficiently involved in interstate com-
merce to warrant the Board's assertion of jurisdiction, the Board has adopted minimum
standards of interstate monetary dealings. Thus, in Federal Dairy Co., Inc., 91 N.L.R.B.
638, 26 L.R.R.M. 1538 (1950), the Board stated that, given the time and budgetary con-
straints it faced, the Board would decline jurisdiction where the employer's only inter-
state dealings involved the direct inflow of goods and that inflow was less than $500,000
in value annually. 91 N.L.R.B. at 639, 26 L.R.R.M. at 1539. (See also, Dorn's House of
Miracles, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 632, 633, 26 L.R.R.M. 1545, 1546 (1950) where a
$1,000,000 indirect inflow of goods was deemed sufficient to justify the assertion of
jurisdiction).
4 97 N.L.R.B. at 427, 29 L.R.R.M. at 1009. Section 152(2) of the Act excludes
from the definition of the term "employer"
the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any
Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any
corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earn-
ings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, or any
person subject to the Railway Labor Act ....
Petitioner, in Columbia, argued that the specific exclusion of only charitable hospitals in
$ 152(2) supported an inference that Congress did not intend to exclude from coverage
of the Act other nonprofit organizations. 97 N.L.R.B. at 427, 29 L.R.R.M. at 1099. The
Board, however, noted that the Conference Report on the LMRA indicated congres-
sional approval of the Board's policy of asserting jurisdiction over nonprofit organiza-
tions "only in exceptional circumstances and in connection with purely commercial ac-
tivities of such organizations." Id.
'E.g., Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 152 N.L.R.B. 704, 705-06, 59 L.R.R.M.
1161, 1161-62 (1965); University of Miami, 146 N.L.R.B. 1448, 1450, 56 L.R.R.M.
1085, 1086 (1964).
° See Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 332, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269, 1273 (1970).
7 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970).
° Id. at 334, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1275. In Cornell University, the Board, in reaching its
decision to assert jurisdiction, first examined the tremendous interstate commercial in-
volvement of the institution along with noting the magnitude of the institution's annual
budget and then current assets and portfolio. /d. at 330, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1271. Next, the
Board looked to § 14(c) of the Landrum-Griffin Act where Congress "authorized and
set limits on the Board's discretionary refusal to exercise jurisdiction." /d. at 331, 74
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Shortly after the Cornell decision, the Board, in Rule 103.1
specified a minimum gross annual revenue figure of $1 million as the
touchstone for determining which colleges would come within its
fold.° The Board estimated that approximately 80 percent of all pri-
vate colleges and universities would be covered under this standard.
However, certain questions concerning the Board's assertion of juris-
diction remain unanswered. The most troublesome of these concerns
the distinction between public and private institutions in determining
what constitutes a "private" institution over which the Board will as-
sert jurisdiction.
The line between private and public institutions has not been
neatly drawn. In the private industrial sector, growing governmental
financial input has resulted in a situation where many of the so-called
"private industries" are financed by a mix of public tax and private
investment dollars." Similarly, many educational institutions which
were originally established through private endowments have increas-
ingly relied on heavy public support." In contrast, many so-called
"public universities" presently operate as essentially private institu-
tions. These universities are virtually autonomous from the state in
the sense that although they receive some government funding, they
are managed internally by people who have no connection with the
government." This merging of public and private characteristics has
presented the Board with the problem of determining, in the univer-
sity sector, which universities should appropriately be considered
"quasi-public" employers.
In interpreting Section 2(2) of the Act,' 3 the Board has dealt
with the problem of defining a "quasi-public" employer in other in-
L.R.R.M. at 1272. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(c). The Board concluded from its examination of
that section that "[w]hile the language of Section 14(c) does not compel the Board to as-
sert jurisdiction, it does manifest a congressional policy favoring such assertion where
the Board finds that the operations of a class of employers exercise a substantial effect
on commerce?' Id. at 332, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1272. In light of these statutory guidelines
and in view of the economic impact of federal involvement in the educational institu-
tions, the Board overruled Columbia University and asserted jurisdiction. Id. at 332-334,
74 L.R.R.M. at 1273-75.
The First Circuit, in the only circuit court decision in the area of college unit de-
terminations, accepted as a valid exercise of its administrative authority the Board's
reevaluation of the congressional policy on the question of Board jurisdiction over
non-profit employers. For a discussion of that circuit court decision see text at notes
152-156 infra.
"National Labor Relations Board: Statement of Procedures, Rules and Regulations,
Series 8, as amended, 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1959).
'° Menard & DiGiovanni, NLRB Jurisdiction over Colleges and Universities: A Plea for
Rulemaking, 16 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 599, 604-05 (1975).
" Examples of this support are "government aid to education programs, public
loans for students, and government contracts." Menard & DiGiovanni, supra note 10, at
604-05.
12 See Menard & DiGiovanni, supra note 10, at 604.
13 Section 2(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1974) provides:
The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an em-
ployer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any
939
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dustries. In determining whether a particular quasi-public industrial
employer is a "political subdivision" within the framework of Section
2(2),and thus not subject to its jurisdiction, the Board, in general, has
looked at three factors. The existence of even one of these factors
constitutes a sufficient basis for a denial of jurisdiction. The first factor
is whether the employer-institution was state created and/or adminis-
tered by state-appointed officials; the second is whether the
employer-institution performs an essential governmental function;
and the third factor is significant state control.
The Board's first post-Cornell decision in this area was Temple
University.'s Originally chartered as a private-non-profit college, Tem-
ple was absorbed into the state's higher education system in 1965 by
the Pennsylvania legislature. Although the institution remained nom-
inally private, the Board did not assert jurisdiction, finding that the
heavy degree of state control made it a "State-related University" and
one which had a "unique relationship with the state."16 The Board
ruled that because of this "unique 'relationship", "it would not effec-
tuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction over the
University."17 In so holding, the Board rested its decision against
jurisdiction upon its discretionary powers," and not on the theory
that the University was a "political subdivision" of the state within the
meaning of Section 2(2) and therefore specifically excluded from the
purview of the Act. By resting its decision on Temple University's
"unique relationship" to the state, the Board effectively carved out an
exception to the jurisdictional standards of Rule 103.1." Yet, it failed
whollY owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or
any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the
Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or any labor organiza-
tion (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the
capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
"Note, The NLRB's Assertion of Jurisdiction Over Universities, 32 UNIV. Or Pin'. L.
REV. 416, 425-26 (1971), and cases cited therein.
" 194 N.L.R.B. 1160,79 L.R.R.M. 1196 (1972).
"Id. at 1160, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1197. Among the factors considered by the Board
in determining that Temple University was a "State-related University" were state con-
trol over the composition of the Board of Trustees, regulation of tuition for state resi-
dents, inclusion of the University's annual budget request in the state's overall budget,
state reporting requirements and, perhaps most significantly, the fact that some 67% of
the institution s budget was comprised of state money. Id.
Apparently, this 67% figure was significant to the Board since it demonstrated
that the public financial support exceeded private endowment. See id.
"Id. at 1161, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1198.
"See id. The source of this discretionary power is unclear. Section 14(c)(1) of the
Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 164(c)(1) provides only that:
The Board in its discretion, may. ... decline to assert jurisdict ion over any
labor dispute involving any class or category of employees where, in the
opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not
sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction ....
In Temple, however, the University admitted that it not only was an "employer" but also
met the "affecting commerce" standard set forth in Cornell. Id.
"See text at note .9 supra.
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to articulate the distinctions, if any, between this exception and the
exclusion of "political subdivisions." This failure to articulate the dis-
tinctions, and, additionally, the failure to enunciate any standards for
the application of the "unique relationship" exception might allow an
unwarranted expansion of the "political subdivision" exception as it
has developed in industrial contexts.
These factors may, however, no longer present a problem. In
recent decisions, the Board, while not officially abandoning this
"unique relationship" jurisdictional exception, has seemingly indicated
that the exception will be stringently limited to situations where state
intervention affects the university's handling of its labor relations. An
example of this shift may be seen in the Board's treatment of Howard
University." Originally, in Howard, the Board, over a strong dissent,
relied upon the "unique relationship" jurisdictional exception in refus-
ing to assert jurisdiction over the University." The dissenters argued
that the Board should adopt its Cornell approach 22
 in the quasi-public
university area in all situations except where the Government has ef-
fective control over the conduct of labor relations at the educational
institution. 23 Recently, however, the Board reevaluated the facts of
" 211 N.L.R.B. 247, 86 L.R.R.M. 1389 (1974).Si Id. at 248, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1391. The majority, in declining to assert jurisdiction
over the University, initially noted that Howard University was established by congres-
sional charter and its operations had been traditionally funded, in part, by the federal
government. /d. at 247, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1391. Pursuant to its charter, Howard Univer-
sity received its funds from Congress by way of a line item in HEW's annual budget;
however, to receive the money, the University had to relinquish to the Secretary of
HEW the control and supervision of those appropriations. Consequently, when the
University was expending federal funds for an item costing over $2,500, it had to
purchase that item through the GSA. The federal money had generally represented
approximately 50% of the total academic budget. See id. at 247, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1390. In
addition, the majority noted that it had been the University's policy to maintain com-
parability between the wages and benefits of its non-faculty employees and those of the
Federal Government employees. Id. Moreover, the majority concluded that because of
the "unique relationship" between the Federal Government and the University, effective
use of the collective bargaining process would involve many Federal Agencies over
which the Board could not assert jurisdiction. Id. at 248, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1391.
22 In Cony!! the Board focused on the University's impact on interstate com-
merce. See note 8 supra.
'a 211 N.L.R.B. at 250, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1392. The dissenters argued that the Uni-
versity had not ceded its administrative independence to the Federal Government, and
they further argued, citing Cornell University, that Government funding had, in the past,
been rejected by the Board as a sufficient basis for exempting from the Board's juris-
diction an educational institution. Id. at 249, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1391. The dissenters went
on to assert that, in determining whether to take jurisdiction over such quasi-public in-
stitutions, the proper question for the Board to ask is "whether enough authority over
labor relations is lodged in the University to enable a satisfaction of bargaining obliga-
tions under the Act." Id., 86 L.R.R.M. at 1392. Moreover, the dissenters noted that the
majority's reasoning, based on Federal Agency involvement, opened the door for a new
area of labor relations not covered by congressional legislative regulation: "For if state
labor relations agencies follow the same rationale, they will also dedine jurisdiction
wherever other governmental agencies are sufficiently involved in the financial affairs
of private employers, regardless of who actually conducts their labor relations." Id. at
250, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1392.
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Howard," and held that Howard's relationship to the Federal Gov-
ernment was distinguishable from Temple's relationship to Pennsyl-
vania, for, in spite of receipt of substantial Federal monetary aid (rep-
resenting about 60% of the University's budget) and some policing of
expenditures of such funds, Howard had never been required to cede
administrative independence to the Federal Government. The most
important element noted by the Board was Howard's autonomy over
its own personnel and labor relations matters. 25 Thus, while the
Board purported to apply the Temple "unique relationship" jurisdic-
tional standard, it would seem that, given the existence of the signifi-
cant financial involvement of the Federal Government in the Univer-
sity, and further given the Board's emphasis on the University's au-
tonomy in handling its personnel and labor relations matters, the
Board was, in fact, applying the standard enunciated by the dissenters
in the original Howard decision.
The Board's decision in University of Vermont" may be reviewed
as additional support for the inference that the Board has, or is pre-
pared to limit the "unique relationship" exception. In that decision,
the Board was confronted with another hybrid educational
institution?' yet it made no reference to the "unique relationship"
standard. The Board simply ruled that the University, although re-
ceiving about a quarter of its funds from the State, was not a "political
subdivision" of the State." Since the University was not a "political
subdivision" of the State and since the University met the requisite in-
terstate commerce standards," the Board asserted jurisdiction over
the institution."
While the University of Vermont decision can be read merely as an
example of a quasi-public institution that is so independent of state
influence that a "unique relationship" analysis is unwarranted, it
would seem that the Vermont decision, coupled with the Board's deci-
sion in Howard University, indicates that the Board will assert jurisdic-
tion over a quasi-public university as long as there exists the requisite
interstate commerce and university autonomy in the handling of its
labor relations, and as long as the university is not a "political subdivi-
24 224 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 92 L.R.R.M. 1249 (1976).
"M. at 	 , 92 L.R.R.M. at 1251.
2 ° 223 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 91 L.R.R.M. 1570 (1976).
27 State legislation in 1955 had transformed the University from a private institu-
tion to "an instrumentality of the state for providing public higher education." No. 66
[1955] Vt. Acts 57.
28 223 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 91 L.R.R.M. 1570 (1976). The Board found that the
University, "although receiving about 25 percent of its total revenues from'the State is
completely independent of the State as to administration, personnel policies, accounting
procedure and in other essential areas free from state control." (The L.R.R.M. report
has omitted the jurisdictional section of the Board's decision in UVM, therefore see
University of Vermont, No. 626 (D-Vt., filed March 29, 1976) ).
29 The University's gross annual revenue exceeded $1 million and it purchased
or received goods valued in excess of $50,000 from points outside of the State. Univer-
sity of Vermont, slip op. at 2.
" University of Vermont, slip op. at 2.
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sion" of the state or Federal Government.
II. UNIT DETERMINATIONS
A. Pan-Time Faculty
Part-Time Faculty Included in the Unit
For forty years, the Board has followed in the industrial sector a
consistent policy of including in the same unit regular part-time em-
ployees with full-time employees doing similar work. This policy con-
trolled despite the fact that regular part-time and full-time employees
frequently enjoy different economic benefits and working condi-
tions. 3 ' The Board followed this practice when it first entered the
area of college-unit determinations, and rejected employer arguments
that faculty should be treated differently from industrial employees.
Thus in Long Island University (C.W. Post Center), 32 the Board included
part-time faculty in the unit of full-time faculty despite the fact that
they were not eligible for the same fringe benefits as full-time faculty;
had no voting or tenure rights; and had substantially lesser salaries
when compared on a semester-hour basis to full-timers. 33
 In making
such a unit determination the Board emphasized the fact that part-
time faculty were professionals, performing the same basic function as
full-time faculty. In light of the shared teaching role, the Board stated
that neither the difference in benefits, the high ratio of part-time to
full-time employees, nor the fact that the part-timers received addi-
tional compensation elsewhere militated against including the part-
time faculty in the full-time unit. This finding was buttressed by the
fact that, although unable to vote, the part-timers could attend and
participate in faculty meetings."
A similar fact pattern existed in University of New Haven 35 where
part-timers were also included in the bargaining unit." However,
while in C.W. Post the Board made no distinction between part-timers
on the basis of the number of class hours taught, in University of New
Haven, the Board emphasized that the adjunct faculty members were
"regular" part-time employees and defined the term "regular part-
time employees" as including only those part-time faculty members
who taught at least three hours a week (compared to twelve hours for
31 Sears, Roebuck & Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 1266, 1266, 68 L.R.R.M. 1469, 1469
(1968); Southern 111. Sand Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1490, 1492, 50 L.R.R.M. 1414 (1962);
Booth Broadcasting Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 817, 820, 49 L.R.R.M. 1278 (1961); Jat Transp.
Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 780, 786, 46 L.R.R.M. 1405 (1960). The practice goes back at least
to 1937 - see William Diamonds & Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 859, 865, 1 L.R.R.M. 116 (1937).
32 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 77 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1971).
"Id. at 906, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1003.
34 Id.
35 190 N.L.R.B. 478, 77 L.R.R.M. 1273 (1971).
"Id. at 478, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1274.
(1)
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full-time faculty members); participated in deliberations of the
school's board of governors; and had an average length of service of'
six years." The Board extended this rationale in University of Detroit,38
where it adopted a new standard to define "regular" part-time em-
ployees. In University of Detroit, the Board determined that only part-
time faculty who taught at least 25% of a full load would be consid-
ered "regular" part-time employees, and thereby could be included in
a unit with full-time faculty.3" The Board believed that such a stand-
ard was necessary to insure that the part-timers included in the full-
time faculty unit would have a substantial and continuing interest in
the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of the unit
employees.4"
Despite wide application,'" the University of Detroit standard was
substantially modified in Catholic University42 due to difficulties in ap-
plying the 4:1 ratio.43 After some extensive alterations and adap-
tions, the Board in Catholic University included in the bargaining unit
any part-time faculty with 25% or more of a full load and any part-
timers who maintained this teaching load pursuant to a written ap-
pointment in at least one semester during any two of the previous
three consecutive academic years."
(2) Part - Time Faculty Excluded
Although significantly altered in Catholic University, the New
Haven rule was not officially abandoned until the Board's decision in
New York University.45 In that decision the Board excluded all part-
time faculty members from the faculty unit." The decision was
grounded on four principal distinctions between full- and part-time
employees: compensation; participation in University governance;
eligibility for tenure; and working conditions.47 With respect to com-
pensation, the Board found that although part-time faculty received
modest salaries amounting to a "respectable honorarium," most of
"Id., 77 L.R.R.M. at 1274.
3° 193 N.L.R.B. 566, 78 L.R.R.M. 1273 (1971).
"Id. at 567, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1274.
"Id. In University of Detroit part-timers participated in University governance,
had educational backgrounds similar to full-timers and "in the classroom engage[d] in
exactly the same activity—teaching." Id. On the other hand, most fringe benefits were
not available to them, and they could not attain tenure. Id.
Tusculum College, 199 N.L.R.B. 28, 32, 81 L.R.R.M. 1345, 1349 (1972);
Manhattan College, 195 N.L.R.B. 65, 66, 79 L.R.R.M. 1253, 1254-55 (1972); cf. Florida
Southern College, 196 N.L.R.B. 888, 889, 80 L.R.R.M. 1160, 1163 (1972).
42 201 N.L.R.B. 929,82 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1973).
43/d. at 930, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1386. From the record the Board was unable to cal-
culate a precise average teaching load for the full-time faculty.
"Id. at 931, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1386.
0 205 N.L.R.B. 4, 83 L.R.R.M. 1549 (1973).
"Id. at 8,83 L.R.R.M. at 1553.
" Id. at 7, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1552.
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their income came from other sources." Furthermore, part-time fac-
ulty were not eligible for fringe benefits.'" As for general University
governance, the Board found that part-timers were excluded in that
they could not participate in department decisions on appointments,
promotions or tenure, nor were they consulted with regard to cur-
riculum matters, degree requirements, selection of department chair-
men, or admissions requirements. The Board further found that un-
like full-time faculty, none of the part-time faculty was eligible for ten-
ure. Finally, with respect to working conditions, the Board observed
that part-timers were not expected to engage in research, writing or
other creative endeavors; nor were they expected to counsel students
or participate in department or University affairs. 5 °
Considering all of the foregoing facts, a majority of the Board
was persuaded that there existed such a dissimilarity of interests be-
tween full and part-time faculty, that they should not be in the same
unit. 5 ' Chairman Miller dissented, however, arguing that the
majority's fragmentation of the unit would impede rather than
further the purposes of the Act. By mandating separate bargaining
units, the majority, in effect, was creating two competing faculty units
that would separately bargain for the same budget dollars, and
thereby hinder any University attempts at accommodation." Member
Fanning also dissented, arguing that the Board's original rationale for
the inclusion of the part-time faculty—similar qualifications and
functions—should be controlling. Fanning asserted that "tangential
matters only indirectly related to the faculty's role as teachers should
not be allowed to obscure [the Board's] judgment." 53 The arguments
presented in dissent have not proved persuasive, however, as the New
York University ruling has been widely followed." Still, the decision
raises the perplexing issue of whether the part-time faculty, now
segregated from full-timers, can exist as a separate unit.
(3) Part-Time Faculty in a Separate Unit
One of the concerns voiced in dissent in New York University was
whether the Board, by excluding all part-time faculty members, was
inevitably moving towards recognizing a unit composed of only part-
40 Id. The majority' of the N.Y.U. part-timers were "moon-lighting" high school
teachers in the School of Continuing Education. Id. at 7 n.1 I, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1552 n.I I.
"Id. at 7, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1552.
"id., 83 L.R.R.M. at 1552-53.
" /d., 83 L.R.R.M. at 1553.
"Id. at 10, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1555.
"/d. at I1, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1555.
" University of Vermont, 223 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 91 L.R.R.M. 1570, 1573 (1976);
Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. No. 169, 91 L.R.R.M. 1017, 1019 (1975); University of
Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634, 637, 87 L.R.R.M. 1634, 1639 (1974); Point Park College, 209
N.L.R.B. 1064, 1064, 85 L.R.R.M. 1542, 1544 (1974); University of San Francisco, 207
N.L.R.B. 12, 13, 84 L.R.R.M. 1403, 1404 (1973).
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time faculty members. 55
 The majority chose not to respond to this
issue in the abstract, but left the question open for later decision." In
Goddard College," the only case to date in which the Board has
reached the issue of the appropriateness of a unit composed solely of
part-time faculty, the Board denied the petitioners unit status. 55 In
that case, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) sought to rep-
resent part-time faculty in its own bargaining unit, rather than in a
unit comprised both of full-time and part-time faculty. The Board in
Goddard recognized the unit comprised of full-time faculty, but ex-
cluded, among others, the cycle (part-time) faculty in the adult degree
program." With respect to the AFT's alternative request to represent
a separate unit of part-time faculty which included the cycle faculty as
well as other part-timers, the Board noted that the excluded groups
were essentially heterogeneous, with their only similarity being part-
time status." The Board therefore denied certification based on what
it believed to be a lack of sufficient community of interest between the
groups." This denial casts doubt on the ability of part-timers to
achieve independent unit status and thus emphasizes the significance
of any decision to exclude part-timers from the full-time faculty unit.
(4) Part-Time Faculty As Independent Contractors
At this juncture, the Board has merely segregated part-timers
from full-time faculty units. A reasonably defensible argument may be
made, however, for their total exclusion from bargaining units on the
basis of their status as independent contractors." In general terms,
" 205 N.L.R.B. at 10, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1555.
"Id. at 8 n.I2, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1553 n.12.
" 216 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 88 L.R.R.M. 1228 (1975).
"Id. at	 , 88 L.R.R.M. at 1230.
"Id. at	 , 88 L.R.R.M. at 1231. The core faculty in the Goddard Masters pro-
gram, the faculty in the Goddard-Cambridge Graduate Program in Social Change, all
visiting faculty, and the faculty in the Goddard Experimental Program in Further Edu-
cation were the other part-timers excluded.
"Id. at	 , 88 L.R.R.M. at 1230.
61 In its New York University decision, the Board faced the full-time faculty as in-
dependent contractors question:
Although the Employer correctly urges that the central issue in de-
termining independent contractor status is whether the recipient of ser-
vices has the right to control the manner and means of performance as
well as the result, the only significant factor suggesting a positive conclu-
sion is the faculty's relative freedom in determining course content. Even
there the individual faculty member is not tetally .
 free, since the general
content of the course may be determined by a consensus of the school or
department involved, and the University's rules of tenure provided that he
"should not introduce into his teaching controversial matter that has no re-
lation to his subject." Its weight is further diluted by the professional status
of the faculty, which demands the exercise of discretion and judgment.
Determination of the details, and indeed the manner, of instruction would
appear to be peculiarly within the province of a professional teacher and
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the distinction between an independent contractor and an employee
hinges on "whether the recipient of services has the right to control
the manner and means of performance as well as the result."" Part-
time faculty, as the Board noted in New York University, have their
primary employment elsewhere." They often contract to teach one or
more courses at a negotiated price per course, rather than a proration
of a full-timer's annual salary. In fact, some of the very factors which
controlled the New York University decision to exclude part-time fac-
ulty, such as lack of tenure or fringe benefits and non-participation
in governance, 65 are also factors which argue for independent con-
tractor status.
Another factor in favor of characterizing part-timers as inde-
pendent contractors is the factor of autonomy. In many circum-
stances, part-timers are less subject than full-timers to employer control
in teaching. This is true because many part-time faculty are hired to
teach a specialized course, often of their own creation and centering
on their own unique expertise. The contrary argument, based on the
Board's conclusion in New York University that faculty in general do
not have substantial control over the manner and means of perform-
ance of their teaching functions, is open to serious dispute. 66 Teach-
ing is very much an art which few practice alike. The university does
not control what occurs in the classroom, and a teacher's effectiveness
depends in large part upon his own individual style. Further, the
Board's citation of the New York University's rules of tenure prohibi-
tion against "controversial matter unrelated to the subject"' may be
sadly out of context; for such a restriction does no more than mark
the boundaries of academic freedom — which ensures that faculty will
have substantial freedom in the performance of their teaching duties.
Thus, since the faculty in general have arguably substantial control
over the manner and means of performance of their function and
further since part-timers are often subject to even less employer con-
trol than the full-time faculty, the possibility exists that the Board
could ultimately resolve the part-time faculty unit status question by
finding part-timers to be independent contractors.
the absence of this latitude would cast serious, and probably fatal, doubts
on his professional status.
Other factors all point to the conclusion that the faculty are em-
ployees. Instruction is performed on the Employer's premises with its
equipment; faculty may become tenured; and they receive sabbatical leave,
a fixed annual salary, and Employer contributions to a retirement fund.
The faculty are not subject to the entrepreneurial risks and profits nor-
mally associated with independent contractors.
205 N.L.R.B. at 5-6, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1551.
"Id. at 5, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1551.
"Id. at 7, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1552.
"See text at notes 46-5i supra.
" See note 62 supra.
et Id.
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Commentary
The Board's exclusion of part-time faculty in New York University
has several problems. As Member Fanning pointed out in his dissent
in that case, the Board cannot rely on the difference in salaries be-.
Weer) part-time and full-time faculty members if it insists that full-
time faculty do more work, proportionately, than their part-
time brethren.['" Then too, if part-time faculty are excluded because full-
time faculty work a 50 to 60 hour week, why are professional
librarians—who may work a 35 or 40 hour week—included in the
unit?" As for participation in governance, Fanning pointed out that
not all the hill-time faculty at New York University enjoyed that
privilege. Further, Fanning perceived that the majority's reliance on
this factor seemingly designates participation in governance as a man-
datory subject of bargaining,'" for the concept of community of in-
terest, which lies at the heart of any unit determination, is based on
all members of a bargaining unit having similar continuing interests in
the mandatory subjects of bargaining—wages, hours, and conditions
of employment. Therefore, since the majority found the part-timers'
non-participation in governance a significant factor in excluding the
part-timers from the full-time faculty unit, it would follow that the
majority viewed governance as a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Moreover, if governance is indeed a mandatory subject of bargaining,
then a faculty senate could be considered a "labor organization"
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and as such could con-
flict with the union which represents the faculty at the university." If
governance is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, then it is dif-
ficult to understand the majority's reliance on it as a factor warranting
the exclusion of part-time faculty, especially since the Board's self-
expressed function in unit determination proceedings is to establish
units which have "a direct relevancy to the circumstances within which
collective bargaining must take place.""
" 205 N.L.R.B. at 11, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1556.
"" See Part II, Section D(2) pa. The Board's position that librarians may be an
appropriate part of a faculty unit appears to have changed. See Yeshiva Univ.. 221
N.L.R.B. No. 169, 91 L.R.R.M. 1017; 1021 (1975).
" 205 N.L.R.B. at 11 - 12, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1556.
7 ' For a discussion of faculty senates as "labor orgnaizations" see Part IV. Section
A(I) A "labor organization" is defined in § 152(5) of the Act as:
Any organization of any kind, (Jr any agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions vf
work. (emphasis supplied).
The topics enumerated in the definition above represent mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing. If governance is included as such a mandatory subject, the faculty senate could be
ruled a "labor organization" since it deals with the university extensively in the area of
the scope of faculty participation in governance.
72 Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 137, 49 L.R.R.M. 1715 (1962)
quoted, interestingly enough, by the majority in New York University as support for their
exclusion of part-time faculty.
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The majority's reliance on tenure as a reason for excluding
part-time faculty from the full-time faculty unit is also suspect. The
tenure system does not apply to all full-time faculty. In University of
Miami," for example, the Board noted the distinctions between full-
time faculty on regular, term and indefinite appointments, yet in-
cluded all of the full-time faculty in the unit." The Miami decision
was followed in New York University Medical Center,' where the Board,
in the course of dismissing a recognition petition for a unit of
psychiatrists on the ground that the separate unit was too fragmented,
stated that differences in tenure or tenure-eligibility was not a sig-
nificant factor.7° Furthermore, in other decisions the Board has in-
cluded terminal-contract faculty," those who have been denied tenure,
and librarians"—not ordinarily eligible for tenure—in the same unit
with full-time faculty. In addition, the very factor of tenure itself must
be re-examined especially in view of the fact that it is nothing more
than a guarantee of certain procedural protections. Tenure provides a
measure of job security only insofar as it protects a faculty member
from termination for arbitrary or invidious reasons. It entitles him
to an opportunity to contest his dismissal—it does not insure against it.
Thus, the availability of tenure should not be determinative of the
appropriateness of including part-time faculty in a bargaining unit
containing full-time faculty.
The final factor relied on by the majority in determining to ex-
clude the part-timers from the full-time faculty unit in New York
University was "working conditions." The unpersuasiveness of this final
factor is best illustrated by Member Fanning, who pointed out that the
research and citizenship responsibilities of the full-time faculty were
ancillary to their primary employment relationship and as such should
not be regarded as a significant factor in determining that the full-
time faculty have working conditions critically different from those of
the part-timers." Member Fanning further noted that the record
clearly indicated that research activities were not uniformly required
of all full-time faculty, as well as the fact that both parties stipulated
that research scientists in all ranks should be excluded from the full-
time faculty unit." Needless to say, librarians, athletic coaches, and
other professionals who have been included in the unit because their
ultimate purpose converges with that of full-time faculty" are not ex-
73 213 N.L.R.B. 634,87 L.R.R.M. 1634 (1974).
"/d. at 638, 87 L.R.R.M. 1640. In that case the Board also included in the unit
research scientists and program specialists in governance. Id. at 638-39, 87 L.R.R.M. at
1641.
73 217 N.L.R.B. No. 116,89 L.R.R.M. 1045 (1975).
"M. at 	 ,89 L.R.R.M. at 1049.
"See Part II, Section D(3) infra.
"See note 69 supra.
7° 205 N.L.R.B. at II, 83 L.R.R.M at 1556.
"/d.
See Part II, Section D infra.
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petted to engage in such activities. 82
Of course, the clear implication of the total exclusion of part-
timers from representation would be not only to deny them self-
organizational rights common to full-time faculty, but, also, to place
them in the posture of excommunicants, cut off from participation at
the bargaining table without either an administration or union
spokesman to represent their interests. In the realpolitik of collective
bargaining only one result, as already perceived by the dissenters in
New York University, can obtain, and that is that part-time interests will
be subverted." Whether the true purposes of the Act will be served
by the exclusion of such a significant faculty group from the collective
bargaining process or whether, alternatively, the interests of the col-
lege or university will be served by the exclusion of part-timers is
doubtful. If a college is a community of scholars, the creation of a
class of scholar more equal than another class appears discriminatory
and divisive. Certainly, some part-time faculty are so casual and tran-
sient that their exclusion from the unit is proper, but the Board's
sweeping presumption of exclusion should be reassessed. A better
rule would be a presumption for inclusion unless it can be shown that
part-time employment is so intermittent that exclusion is justified or
that the nature of their contractual arrangement with the institution is
so significantly different from that of regular full-timers that depar-
ture from the historical precedent of inclusion of part-time personnel
is warranted.
B. Department Chairmen
Perhaps the single most difficult issue the Board has confronted
in the college unit area is the question of the supervisory status of de-
partment chairmen." Section 2(11) of the Act 85 defines "supervisor"
as follows:
... any individual having authority, in the interest of the
82 In the health care industry, the Board has continued to adhere to its tradi-
tional rule and has included regular pan-time employees in the unit with full-timers.
See, e.g., Annapolis Emergency Hospital, 217 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 89 L.R.R.M. 1173, 1174
(1975) (part-time and full-time registered nurses in the same unit). The Board has,
however, excluded temporary employees from a full-time unit. Paramount General
Hospital, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 89 L.R.R.M. 1853, 1854 (1975).
23 See 205 N.L.R.B. at 10-13, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1555-58.
"4 Most institutions are divided by subject area into schools or colleges, which are
usually headed by a dean. This position has consistently been excluded as supervisory,
either by stipulation or pursuant to a determination by the Board upon an established
record. The schools or colleges are further broken down into departments, headed by a
chairman or department head. At some institutions the term "sequence" is used instead
of "department." On occasion, several related departments are grouped into a division,
headed by a chairman or director. In addition, an institution may have certain "pro-
grams" headed by a director or chairman. Finally, the supervisory status of assistant
and associate deans, and directors of admissions is sometimes disputed. The Board's
treatment of the issue with respect to department chairmen will be analyzed as illustra-
tive of its treatment of all these positions.
" 29 U.S.C. 152 (11) (1970).
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employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, pro-
mote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other em-
ployees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in
connection with the foregoing the exercise of such author-
ity is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires
the use of independent judgment.
Inasmuch as this language is set forth in the disjunctive, possession of
any one of the indicia of authority listed confers supervisory status. 86
Furthermore, the authority need not be exercised; possession alone is
sufficient." The Courts of Appeals have generally deferred to the
Board's expertise to distinguish from among the many possible "subtle
gradations of authority" 88
 those which require the exercise of inde-
pendent judgment as opposed to those which merely require routine
application of previously set guidelines.
The characteristics of the position of department chairman vary
both from institution to institution, and often from one department to
another within an institution. Chairmen may be elected by the
faculty," appointed by the dean with" or without" consultation of
the faculty, or may serve on a rotating basis." They may be selected
from the department's faculty or come from without the institution.
On occasion, they rise to higher administrative positions; more often,
they return to ordinary faculty status at the expiration of their term
of office. They usually—but not always—receive an increment in sal-
ary upon assuming office."
The major controversy over whether a department chairman is a
supervisor revolves around two areas: whether the chairman's rec-
ommendations in personnel areas are "effective", thereby coming
within that part of Section 2(11) which provides that an employee may
" Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385, 387, 24 L.R.R.M. 2350, 2352 (6th
Cir. 1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 899 (1949).
" Id. at 388, 24 L.R.R.M. at 2353. The Board, however, has refused to recognize
the genuineness of "paper" supervisors. Omaha Neon Sign Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 1385,
1386-87, 68 L.R.R.M. 1585 (1968); See NLRB v. American Oil Co., 387 F.2d 786.
787-88, 66 L.R.R.M. 2539, 2540-41 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 391 U.S. 906 (1967). A "paper
supervisor" is a nonsupervisory employee who is "promoted" to supervisor without re-
ceiving any more duties or responsibilities. See Omaha Neon Sign Co., 170 N.L.R.B. at
1387.
" NLRB v. Magnesium Casting Co., 427 F.2d 114, 117, 74 L.R.R.M. 2234, 2236
(1st Cir. 1970) affd, Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, 401 U.S. 137 (1971) citing NLRB
v. Swift & Co., 292 F.2d 561, 48 L.R.R.M. 2695 (1st Cir. 1961). But see, NLRB v. South-
ern Airways Co., 290 F.2d 519, 521-25, 48 L.R.R.M. 2205, 2207-09 (5th Cir. 1961)
enforcing in part, 124 N.L.R.B. 749, 44 L.R.R.M. 1483.
°° C. W. Post, 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 906, 77 L.R.R.M. 1001, 1004 (1971).
" Id.
°' University of Detroit, 193 N.L.R.B. 566, 568, 78 L.R.R.M. 1273, 1275 (1971).
" Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 673, 675, 84 L.R.R.M. 1033, 1035
(1973).
"See, for example, University of Detroit, 193 N.L.R.B. 566, 568, 78 L.R.R.M.
1273, 1275 (1971).
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be found to be a supervisor if that employee has the authority to
"effectively ... recommend such action,"94 and, even if "effective,"
whether the chairman's "collegial" relationship to his faculty so dilutes
the recommendations that he cannot be considered an individual
supervisor exercising independent judgment on behalf of the em-
ployer.
(1) Chairmen Included
In cases where the Board has ruled that department chairmen
were not supervisors, the position of chairman was found to be essen-
tially titular rather than functional. The chairmen were really only a
conduit for faculty action regarding policy and personnel matters
rather than effective heads of the departments. Thus, in University of
Detroit," the department head was found to be merely one voice
among many, possessing no real authority effectively to recommend
personnel and policy matters.9°
In declining to recognize chairmen as supervisors in the Detroit
case the Board said: "the chairman's recommendation (on personnel
matters], if any, is just one of several made to the appropriate univer-
sity official or body. ... the record does not reveal whether the
chairman's recommendations are accorded greater weight than those
of the faculty or dean."°7
This concept of effective authority has remained the primary
factor in the Board's determination of the status of department
chairmen. For example, when the problem of the department
chairmen's status at Fordham University came before the Board in
1971 and again in 1974,98 chairmen were included in the bargaining
unit.99 As in its University of Detroit decision, the Board looked primar-
ily to the effectiveness of the chairmen's recommendations on person-
nel matters. In Ford/tam I the Board found that a chairman's person-
nel recommendations were made with the advice and consent of his
"See text at note 85 supra.
n 193 N.L.R.B. 566,78 L.R.R.M. 1273 (1971).
• Id. at 568, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1275. For example, in hiring situations the depart-
ment chairman and the faculty would separately review candidates (the record being
unclear as to whether each submitted separate recommendations to the dean on any
promotion and tenure case) with a University committee of' faculty and administrators
overseeing the entire process. If a chairman found that a faculty member was not per-
forming satisfactorily, he would report this to the dean without a formal recommenda-
tion. There was no evidence that chairmen played any role in the decision not to reap-
point nontenured faculty, or in dismissal proceedings for tenured faculty. The chair-
man did assign courses in some departments but did not direct the work of the faculty•
in any way. Iie had no role in determining salaries for faculty. /d.
• 193 N.L.R.B. 134, 78 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1971) & 219 N.L.R.B. No. 137, 87
L.R.R.M. 1643 (1979).
s° 193 N.L.R.B. at 139, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1183; 214 N.L.R.B. at 	 , 87
L.R.R.M. at 1648.
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faculty.'°° The Board further noted that both tenure and promotion
decisions were made by a department committee. 10 ' Thus, although
the chairmen received a reduced workload and an extra stipend,'"
the chairmen's lack of effective authority was found to be the control-
ling consideration in the Board's finding that the department chair-
men were not supervisors.'" Similarly, in Fordham II, the Board re-
mained unconvinced that the chairmen's recommendations were suffi-
ciently effective to warrant a positive delineation of supervisory status,
especially since many of the chairnien's recommendations were mod-
ified by the dean.'"
In an attempt to clarify the Board's position on the supervisory
status of department chairmen, the employer in Rosary Hill College'
urged the Board to establish specific criteria to provide guidance for
the resolution of the issue of college and university department
chairmen. The Board's response was evasive, however, as it simply in-
dicated that:
we are not persuaded, on the basis of our experience
... with university cases in which ... supervisory status is in
issue, that faculty department heads generally have or ex-
ercise supervisory authority as it is defined in the Act. And
we see no reason at this time for departing from our usual
practice of requiring an affirmative showing that the dis-
puted faculty department heads have been given one or
more of the inchcia of supervisory authority set forth in
'°° 193 N.L.R.B. at 137, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1181.
Ill Id.
10 ' Id. at 138, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1182.
1 °' The Board in Tusculum College, 199 N.L.R.B. 28, 81 L.R.R.M. 1345 (1972),
compared the status of "division directors" at Tusculum College to that of the chairmen
in Fordham / and similarly ruled that the directors were not supervisors both since their
recommendations were merely one among many, and thus were not necessarily effec-
tive since the administration viewed them as faculty. Id. at 29, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1346-47.
At Tusculum College the directors drew up lob descriptions" with qualifications
for new faculty positions only after full consultation with faculty. Candidates were in-
terviewed by various faculty members, who thereafter submitted their recommendations
along with those of the chairman. Although directors made tenure and reappointment
recommendations, other faculty did so as well. Id. at 28, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1346.
Again in University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634, 87 L.R.R.M. 1634 (1974), the
Board, in determining the status of department chairmen, saw the effectiveness of the
chairmen's recommendations as the critical criterion for determining supervisory au-
thority. The Board noted that in promotion and tenure cases, separate recommenda-
tions from the chairman and his faculty were forwarded up the chain of command to
the dean, dean of faculties, president and, ultimately, to the Board of Trustees. Id. at
637, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1369. As in Fordham, the faculty's recommendation controlled:
In most cases the faculty and chairman are in agreement, but, when they
differ, the higher academic officials give greater weight to a strong faculty
recommendation than to a contrary recommendation by their department
chairman.
Id.
10 ' 214 N.L.R.B. at 	 , 87 L.R.R.M. at 1647.
'°' 202 N.L.R.B. 1137, 82 L.R.R.M. 1768 (1973).
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Section 2(11) or that their recommendations affecting per-
sonnel status are relied on and generally followed.'"
In Rosary Hill, the chairmen's duties and authority were found to be
similar to those of the chairmen in Fordham, and thus' they were in-
cluded in a faculty bargaining unit.'"
The question of whether department chairmen should be clas-
sified as supervisors arose again in Northeastern University,'" where the
Board made a limited excursion into the development of the criteria
requested in Rosary Hill. The Board in Northeastern found the chair-
men not to be supervisors since they generally "shared" their duties
with the faculty in their departments. Their role was "one more of
power through persuasion than power through decree.'"" In so find-
ing, the Board summarized its position on inclusion of the chairman
in the bargaining unit:
In appropriate cases where the chairman's powers have
been effectively diffused among the department faculty
pursuant to the principle of collegiality, the Board has in-
cluded the chairmen. The facts in the present case show
that the chairmen of the various university departments fall
within this qualification.... Accordingly, we find that the
department chairmen are neither supervisors nor manager-
ial employees and we shall include them in the unit."°
Thus, while not providing the specific criteria requested in Rosary Hill,
this summary represents at least a limited guide to the resolution of
the issue of college and university department chairmen status.
(2) Chairmen Excluded
The Board has found department chairmen to be supervisors in
a number of cases, and therefore has excluded them from the faculty
unit. In so ruling, the Board has primarily pointed both to the
chairmen's ability to manipulate effectively the hiring of faculty and to
the effectiveness of the chairmen's recommendations pertaining to fac-
ulty status and merit increases. In the first reported cases following
the Cornell decision, the Board excluded department chairmen as
supervisors. In Long Island University (C.W. Post Center), "' for exam-
'" Id. at 1137, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1768.
'" Id. at 1199, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1770. Chairmen at Rosary Hill were involved in
screening and interviewing candidates for hire, but the chairmen were overshadowed
by a hiring committee selected by the faculty which could veto a chairman's hiring deci-
sion. In cases of promotion or tenure, the chairmen, the faculty, and the students all
submitted recommendations. Id. at 1138, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1770.
'" 218 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 89 L.R.R.M. 1862 (1975).
'"Id. at 	 ., 89 L.R.R.M. at 1868.
"° Id. at 	 , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1868-69. Most recently, department chairmen were
included in the unit in Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. No. 169, 91 L.R.R.M. 1017 (1975).
1 " 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 77 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1971).
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pie, the Board concluded that the chairmen were supervisors, based
upon their authority in the hiring of new faculty," 2 and based upon
their ability to recommend "change of status" of faculty to the dean,
to hire and supervise support personnel, and to recommend
budgets."a Subsequently, in Ade1phi University"' the Board again ex-
cluded the department chairmen from the faculty bargaining unit de-
spite the fact that the chairmen's supervisory powers were far more
"Shared than those of the chairman in C.W. Post."'" The Board
rested its exclusion of chairmen on two grounds: the chairman's
authority to recommend the hiring and reappointment of part-time
faculty (who were included in the unit); and his power to allocate
merit increases to all faculty in the department without deparmental
approval."° Inasmuch as this authority alone was considered suffi-
cient to treat the chairmen as supervisors, the Board did not reach the
question whether they would find supervisor status absent this author-
ity. In more recent cases, the Board has continued to exclude de-
partment chairmen from the full-time faculty unit when the record
indicated that the chairmen had significant responsibilities and au-
thority in the areas of hiring, retention of personnel,'' and allocation
of merit increases.''
Commentary
In determining whether the chairman's recommendations are ef-
fective, the Board is wont to lay great stress on the frequency with
"2 The chairmen conducted interviews and discussed terms of employment with
prospective candidates. Id. at 906, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1004.
" 3 id. at 906, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1004. In Long Island Univ. (Brooklyn Center), 189
N.L.R.B. 909, 77 L.R.R.M. 1006 (1971), the Board merely noted that the duties of
chairmen were similar to those in C.W. Post and that therefore the chairmen should be
excluded. Id. at 909, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1006.
'" 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 79 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1972).
' 18 The Board noted that most of the department chairmen's administrative func-
tions are performed in consultation with and upon agreement of the department's en-
tire faculty." Id. at 641, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1549.
18 Id. at 642, 79 L.R.R1M. at 1549.
17 Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 218 N.L.R.B. No. 220, 89 L.R.R.M. 1844,
1846-47 (1975); Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 673, 675, 84 L.R.R.M. 1033,
1035 (1973); Point Park College, 209 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1064, 85 L.R.R.M. 1542, 1543-44
(1974).
18 Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 218 N.L.R.B. No. 220, 89 L.R.R.M. 1844 (1975).
The Board in Rensselaer found the chairmen's authority to allocate the total dollar
amount for merit increases within his department to be the most important indicator of
supervisory status. Id. at , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1847.
In that decision, the Board effectively summarized the particular responsibilities
that will lead to a supervisory classification of a department chairman.
Based on the foregoing and the record as a whole, we are satisfied that the
department chairmen exercise the authority to make effective recommen-
dations as to hiring and change of status of faculty members, and that they
exercise substantial control over the day-to-day operations of their respec-
tive departments including assignments and monetary benefits and allow-
ances.
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which the dean follows the chairman's recommendations as opposed
to the recommendations of others. This, in effect, makes the dean the
arbiter of "effectiveness." The authority to make effective recommen-
dations, however, is usually vested in the department chairman by the
university's by-laws, not by the dean. The fact that a second-line
supervisor (the dean) does not always, or even usually, follow the ad-
vice of the foreman (the department chairman) does not mean that
the foreman is not a supervisor; he may simply be a supervisor with
whose judgment the second-liner disagrees.
In addition, the fact that a chairman may solicit input from the
department faculty should not serve to vitiate his authority. A good
supervisor often solicits the input of his fellow workers, and such an
approach is especially appropriate among professionals. Indeed, the
elements of discourse and "sharing" of authority are at the heart of
"collegiality," which describes a working condition that many would
consider essential to academic life. Yet, it is crucial that the Board not
be misguided by academic rhetoric to render decisions which destroy
this collegial concept. Decisions which find the dean to be the first level
of supervision will have thisleffect, for under such precedent, the
dean, in a labor relations context, will be far less likely to weigh de-
partmental interests than would the chairmen. Further, by superced-
ing the departmental hierarchy, the Board thereby places inordinate
and unrealistic power in the hands of the university deans. One
consequence of the cases which find department chairmen to be non-
supervisors may well be that deans will be called upon by the ad-
ministration to make personnel decisions which they are, for lack of
departmental input from the chairmen, ill-equipped to make.
(3) The "50%" Rule
The Board has added to the controversy on the issue of depart-
ment chairmen by applying a so-called "50%" rule to its determina-
tions of supervisory status. This rule, as it has evolved, states that an
individual who supervises only non-unit employees will be found to be
a supervisor, and thus excluded, only if his supervisory functions ac-
count for more than 50% of his time. The "50%" rule had its genesis
in Great-Western Sugar Company.' In that case, the Board considered
the question whether individuals employed in a seasonal industry who
spent the major portion of their time as rank-and-file employees, but
who were assigned supervisory duties for a remaining period, should
be excluded from the rank-and-file unit and denied a voice in the
selection of a bargaining representative. The Board held that such in-
dividuals were to be included in the unit, but only with respect to
their rank-and-file duties.'2°
Id. at 	 , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1847.
" 137 N.L.R.B. 551,50 L.R.R.M. 1186 (1962).
120 Id. at 553, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1187
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Dissenting Board members in Great Western raised the issue of
divided loyalty. The dissenters first noted that many of the so-called
"seasonal" supervisors had also been officers and trustees of the
union.' 2 ' They further noted that such seasonal supervisors most
likely wished to retain not only their supervisory status but also the
protection afforded employees under the Act. Given this assumption,
the dissenters asserted that an inherent conflict of interest in the posi-
tion of these supervisors would necessarily exist should they be in-
cluded in the employee unit.' 22 Since the dissenters believed that both
management and the union are entitled to total loyalty, they asserted
that the possibility of divided loyalty represented a sufficient basis for
excluding the seasonal supervisors from the employee unit.'"
In Westinghouse Electric Company,' 24 the Board, cited the princi-
ples established in Great Western Sugar Company, and ruled that profes-
sional engineers, who during the preceding 12 months had spent 50
percent or more of their working time performing non-supervisory
duties and who, when acting as supervisors, supervised only non-unit
personnel, should be included in the bargaining unit.' 25 In a footnote,
the Board recognized the problem of "divided loyalty" but disposed of
it by stating:
... this problem [of divided loyalty] is commonplace
whenever an employer decides to promote a rank-and-file
employee to be a supervisor; ... The problem would seem
to be minimal here, if it exists at all, as the supervisory au-
thority of engineers here involved is exercised with refer-
ence to a separately organizable and differently oriented
group of temporary workers wholly outside the scope of
the unit.'"
In Ade1phi University"' the Board introduced the "50%" rule to a uni-
versity unit determination case and ruled that a chairman's authority
to hire and fire a secretary was not, in and of itself, sufficient evi-
dence of supervisory status.'" In its discussion, the Board asserted
that the underlying rationale for the "50%" rule was that employees
whose principle duties were of the same nature as those of the em-
ployees in the unit should not be excluded from that unit on the basis
of a sporadic exercise of supervisory authority over nonunit person-
nel, since the conflict of interest envisioned by Congress in adopting
Section 2(11) of the Act was a general one, involving an alliance of the
employee with management.'"
121 Id. at 556, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1188.
'"Id.
"'Id., 50 L.R.R.M. at 1189.
1 " 163 N.L.R.B. 723, 64 L.R.R.M. 1440 (1967).
"Id. at 727.
"Id. at 727 n.26.
127 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 79 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1972).
"Id. at 644, 195 N.L.R.B. at 644, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1551.
'"Id., 79 L.R.R.M. at 1551-52.
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Commentary
An examination of the legislative history of Section 2(3) indicates
that Congress, in excluding supervisors from its definition of "em-
ployee," was primarily concerned with the problem of the domination
of supervisors by the rank-and-file unions.' 3 ° Congress apparently be-
lieved that this domination would necessarily manifest itself in at least
some degree of supervisor disloyalty to management.' 3 ' However, in
deciding to exclude supervisors from its definition of "employee" in
the Act, Congress contemplated two types of cases involving potential
union domination, neither of which approximate the type of situation
in which the Board applies its "50%" rule. The two types of cases
about which Congress was concerned involved so-called "indepen-
dent" units of supervisors who supervised the rank and file union
members;' 32 and the inclusion of the supervisors in a unit constituting
the rank-and-file members whom they supervised.' 33
In examining these two types of' cases, Congress first found that
even if the supervisors were separately organized there was,, in fact, no
practical independence from the rank:and-file union, since the super-
visor unit must rely on the rank-and-file union for support if it is to
negotiate effectively with the employer.' 34 Secondly, Congress found
that if the supervisors were directly organized with the rank-and-file
employees whom they were supposed to supervise, the rank-and-file
union influence would greatly decrease the supervisors' effective-
ness.' 35 Congress did not, however, consider the type of situation
130 See H.R. REP. No. 245 & S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted
in 1 NLRB, LEGLISATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Act 1947, at
304-08 (H. Rep. No. 245) & 409-11 (S. Rep. No. 105) (1948). The House Committee
paid lip-service to the possible problem of management, through the supervisors, im-
properly influencing the workers' rights to organize and bargain, id. at 305; however, it
is clear that the Committee was primarily concerned with the independence of the
supervisors from rank and file control.
13 ' The House Committee on this question concluded that:
If we are to produce goods competitively and in such large quantities that
many can buy them at low cost, then, just as there are people on labor's
side to say what workers want and have a right to expect, there must be in
management and loyal to it persons not subject to [the] influence or con-
trol of unions ... not only to assign people to their work, to see that they
keep at their work and do it well, to correct them when they are at fault,
and to settle their complaints and grievances, but [also] to determine how
much work employees should do, what pay they should receive for it, and
to carry on the whole of labor relations. Id. at 307.
'3 Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 96, 11 L.R.R.M. 114 (1942); Packard
Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4, 16 L.R.R.M. 43 (1945).
'" Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 874, 11 L.R.R.M. 122 (1942).
' 34 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra note 130, at 307. The supervisors could not suc-
cessfully strike without an agreement from the rank-and-file that they would not do the
work of the striking supervisors.
'" Id. at 410. As an example of this problem, the Senate Committee cited Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corporation, where, after the supervisory employees were organized
by the United Mine Workers, disciplinary slips issued by those supervisors declined by
two-thirds and the accident rate doubled. Id.
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from which the Board developed its "50%" rule—that in which part-
time supervisory employees are included in a unit of nonsupervisory
employees, where the supervisory employees are only responsible for
nonunit employees. The "50%" rule thus represents a judgment on
the part of the Board that mere union involvement on the part of
supervisory employees is not in and of itself sufficiently detrimental to
supervisor loyalty to warrant the exclusion of the supervisors from the
protection of the Act, as Ion& as the supervisory employees only per-
form their supervisory functions part-time, and are only responsible
for nonunit employees. It is submitted that although the validity of
the Board's assumption that a supervisory employee can at the same
time be both a viable union member and an effective tool of man-
agement is open to dispute,'" the department chairmen situation in-
volves special problems which warrant an abandonment of the "50%"
rule, within the university context. As was discussed earlier, the Board
has often excluded part-time faculty from full-time faculty units.'"
The conflict of loyalties with which Congress was concerned in enact-
ing Sections 2(3) and 2(11) would certainly exist where departmental
chairmen are involved in the hiring of part-time faculty and are at the
same time included in the faculty unit because of the "50%" rule,
Since part-time faculty often are considered a threat to full-time fac-
ulty positions in difficult financial periods, the chairmen could well
be caught in the middle if it became necessary to save money by re-
trenching some full-time faculty colleagues in the bargaining unit and
by hiring part-time faculty instead. This is clearly the type of "divided
loyalty" situation which Congress sought to avoid by excluding super-
visors from the protection of the Act. Thus, in light of its treatment
of part-time faculty, the Board should, at least within the university
framework, refrain from applying its "50%" rule.
(4) Department Chairmen As Managerial Employees
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, does not contain
a specific exclusion for "managerial employees" as it does for super-
visors. However, over the years, such an exclusion has been developed
through case law.'38 The early cases established that such employees
were not to be included in a unit with rank-and-file employees, since
they were "closely related to management.'" Thus, in Ford Motor
Co.,"° the Board summarized its position with respect to managerial
employees.
We have customarily excluded from bargaining units of
rank and file workers executive employees who are in a
position to formulate, determine, and effectuate management
36 See text at notes 121-23 supra.
"'See discussion Part II, Section A(2)supra.
'm See Annual Survey of Labor Law, 16 B.C. IND. & Com. 977.82 (1975).
'3° Freiz and Sons, 47 N.L.R.B. 43, 47, 11 L.R.R.M. 229 (1943).
"° 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 17 L.R.R.M. 394 (1946).
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policies. These employees we have considered and still
deem to be managerial, in that they express and make
operative the decisions of management."'
A reasonably defensible agreement may be advanced that the
position of chairman involves the formulation, determination and ef-
fectuation of management policy. Department chairmen usually par-
ticipate in administrative meetings within their schools on a regular
basis. In formal meetings between chairmen and deans, basic policies
of the school—including budgetary and fiscal matters, curriculum
planning, personnel procedures and problems, areas of student con-
cern and reports from central administration—are discussed. In addi-
tion, deans frequently meet with individual chairmen on an informal
basis throughout the year to review planning and problems within a
particular department. Finally, chairmen are generally responsible for
the effective administration of their departments, including operating
on a budget, conducting departmental meetings, and developing pol-
icy and direction for the department. In light of these functions and
responsibilities, department chairmen may be considered managerial
employees, and as such may properly be excluded from the full-time
faculty unit.
(5) Chairmen As Confidential Employees
The Board has not yet dealt with the question whether depart-
ment chairmen may be excluded from the faculty unit as confidential
employees. In B.F. Goodrich Co., 12 the Board defined the term con-
fidential" as applying only to those employees "who assist and act in a
confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine and effec-
tuate management policies in the field of labor relations." 143 Confi-
dential employees are not specifically excluded by the Act, as are
supervisors, "but their implied exclusion has been deemed necessary
in order to make the Act function," 144 since such employees are privy
to confidential information pertaining to labor relations.
In the university setting, even if the Board finds that chairmen
are not managerial employees, they may find it proper to exclude
them from coverage on the basis of their status as confidential em-
ployees. A number of factors militate in favor of finding that chairmen
are confidential employees in light of the chairmen's relationship with
the university deans. First, as the central administrative figures in
'" Id. at 1322, 17 L.R.R.M. at 395 (emphasis added). See, in accord, Westinghouse
Electric Co. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151, 74 L.R.R.M. 2070 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
831 (1970). See also NLRB v. Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
142
 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 37 L.R.R.M. 1383 (1956).
" 3 Id. at 724, 37 L.R.R.M. at 1384. See also, National Cash Register, 168 N.L.R.B.
910, 912-13, 67 L.R.R.M. 1041, 1045 (1967); Ed's Foodland of Springfield, Inc., 159
N.L.R.B. 1256, 1261, 62 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1966); Vulcanized Rubber and Plastics Co.,
129 N.L.R.B. 1256, 1257-59, 47 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1961).
'" CHARLES MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 217 (BNA 1971).
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their colleges and schools, deans are responsible for policy-making,
budget preparation, and formulation of personnel policies, and are
thus "persons who formulate, determine and effectuate management
policies in the field of labor relations." Chairmen meeting regularly
with their deans in administrative councils share with the deans the
responsibility for developing and effectuating such policies. Moreover,
chairmen evaluate their faculty, have access to and develop their own
personnel files, and are privy to information on the individual salaries
of all employees in their department. Thus, in view of the fact that
chairmen deal extensively with university administrative personnel,
and in so dealing, are privy to valuable collective bargaining informa-
tion, they would seem to be confidential employees and as such, sub-
ject to exclusion from the faculty bargaining unit.
Since most chairmen share indicia of either managerial or confi-
dential status and as previously outlined, have a special trust imposed
on them in these areas, it would appear that continued inclusion of
chairmen in faculty units is contrary to the congressional intent of the
Act. Their inclusion results in a misalignment of such persons with
rank-and-file employees, and thus effectively removes them from po-
sitions where management can place full reliance upon them.
(6) Collective Authority of Faculty
One of the reasons that department chairmen are not found to
be supervisors is that the supervisory authority that exists is shared
with the faculty. The employers have seized on this concept of shared
authority to argue that the faculty, in whole or in part, functions as a
"collective" supervisor or manager. The Board squarely faced this
issue in C.W. Post and, without setting forth a reasoned basis for its
position, concluded:
[W]e are of the view that the policy-making and quasi-
supervisory authority which adheres to full-time faculty
status but is exercised by them only as a group does not
make them supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11)
of the Act, or managerial employees who must be sepa-
rately represented.' 45
In Adelphi University the Board again faced the issue of collective au-
thority. While the Board reached the same result as in C.W. Post,'" it
"' 189 N.L.R.B. at 905, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1003. In Fordham I the Board again
made clear its position that the factor of collective rather than individual exercise of
faculty authority precluded a finding of supervisory status. The Board, however, did
not reach the issue of whether the Faculty Senate or personnel or grievance committees
actually possessed authority to make effective recommendations on major policy mat-
ters. 193 N.L.R.B. at 135, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1179-80.
in 195 N.L.R.B. at 647-48, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1554-56. The personnel committee at
Adelphi was comprised of only eleven individuals, as compared to the Faculty Senate at
C.W. Post which included the entire faculty. Id. at 647, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1554.
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rested its conclusions on a finding that the committee functioned sole-
ly in an advisory capacity. In so finding, the Board noted that the
concept of collegiality did not square with the traditional authority
structures with which the Act was designed to deal; however, the
Board did not view this as a problem. Rather, it suggested that ulti-
mate authority in the university structure rests with the Board of
Trustees, who use the faculty committees not as supervisors or man-
agement representatives but simply as advisors.' 47
The Board further retreated from the issue of faculty collective
authority in New York University. There it indicated that Ade1phi did not
stand for the proposition that the exercise of "true" collegial authority
by a faculty would warrant their exclusion from the Act. The discus-
sion in Ade1phi, the Board suggested, was premised on a theoretical
distinction between the industrial and collegial models. 148 However, in
its haste to disclaim any possibility that faculty members would be ex-
cluded from coverage, the Board offered an analysis which leads to
anomalous results. By its own definition of "true collegiality" in
Ade1phi—ultimate authority resting with one's peer group—'" a fac-
ulty possessed of such authority would be its own employer and
hence would have no use for the collective bargaining process regu-
lated by the Act.
A spin-off of the argument for collective supervisory status is the
argument that participation in organizational activities by senior ten-
ured faculty constitutes a "supervisory taint." Due to their involve-
ment in 'personnel matters, tenured faculty who participate in person-
nel decisions inherently "coerce and restrain" the junior untenured
faculty.
In Northeastern University,' 50 the Board did not reach this argu-
ment because of a procedural defect; however, it is interesting to note
the University's contention that "the Board-conceived doctrine of col-
lective authority as precluding supervisory status fails to vitiate the
impact of supervisory taint." 15 ' This contention has some merit. Re-
gardless of the Board's perception of the tenured faculty's supervisory
status, it is a fact of life at most institutions that a faculty member
cannot attain tenure without the approval of those who already enjoy
it. Thus, given the probability of supervisory taint, it could be argued
that at least the senior tenured faculty possess significant enough
supervisory-like authority to warrant their exclusion from the faculty
bargaining unit.
" 7 Id. at 648, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1555-56. Member Kennedy squarely disagreed with
the majority. In his opinion, the members of the personnel and grievance committees
should be excluded if the committee considered as a whole met the statutory definition
of "supervisor". Diffusion of authority throughout an entire faculty, he stated, was not
analogous to the concentration of such authority in an eleven man committee drawn
from a faculty of 600. Id. at 648, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1556.
141 205 N.L.R.B. at 5, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1550.
149 195 N.L.R.B. at 648, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1556.
15° 218 N.L.R.B. at 	 , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1865.
' 5 ' Id.
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(7) The Wentworth Decision
To date, the only Court of Appeals decision in the area of col-
lege unit determinations is NLRB v. Wentworth Institute."' In
Wentworth the employer contended that faculty were not "employees"
under the Act. It argued that the relationship of faculty to adminis-
trators, was characterized by the notion of shared authority, and thus
was unlike the usual adversarial relationship of labor and manage-
ment. Therefore, collective bargaining could only result in the erosion
of collegiality and academic freedom.'53 The Court responded that it
152 515 F.2d 550, 89 L.R.R.M. 2033 (1st Cir. 1975). Wentworth operated a two-
year program in engineering technology at the "Institute" and a third and fourth-year
program leading to a Bachelor of Science degree at the newer, smaller "College." The
College had about 14 full-time faculty members, the Institute about 100. All had one-
year contracts. The Faculty Senate made recommendations on policy matters, but by its
own constitution these recommendations did not bind the administration and trustees.
The faculty had four meetings per year in which the agenda was prepared by the pro-
vost. However, there was evidence that the following actions took place in faculty meet-
ings: the administration polled the faculty as to preferences regarding class hours at the
Institute and the academic calendars, which results were to play an important part in
the final decision; the faculty was consulted on final examination and graduation re-
quirements; the president discussed tenure with the faculty; the administration met
with the executive committee of the faculty senate to discuss class hours, the academic
calendar, and methods and timing of payment of faculty. /d. at 552, 89 L.R.R.M. at
2034. In Wentworth, the employer sought to challenge the Board's assertion of jurisdic-
tion over colleges and universities by refusing to bargain with the union after it had
been elected and certified as the faculty's bargaining representative. Id. Relying on the
legislative history of the Act, Wentworth contended that there was a "congressional un-
derstanding" to exclude non-profit employers. Id. at 554, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2035. The
First Circuit conceded that the Board had relied on the same legislative history when, in
Columbia University, it declined to assert jurisdiction over colleges and universities. How-
ever, the court noted that the Board in its Columbia University decision never ruled that
it lacked jurisdiction, but that it had only referred to the legislative history for guidance
in the exercise of its discretion. Therefore, the court ruled that it was an entirely
proper exercise of the Board's discretion for it to reevaluate the involvement of colleges
and universities in interstate commerce, and then to assert jurisdiction, as it did in
Cornell. Id. at 555, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2036. Quoting from the Supreme Court's opinion in
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1975), the court said such an
"evolutional approach" was particularly suited to an administrative agency. 515 F.2d at
555, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2037. The court further indicated that its own study of the legisla-
tive history did not clearly show a congressional intent that non-profit employers be ex-
cluded from the Act's coverage. Id., 89 L.R.R.M. at 2036.
In rejecting Wentworth's contention that the Board's assertion of jurisdiction
over faculty would lead to results not intended by Congress, the court said:
(Wihile there are good arguments against permitting faculty members to
bargain collectively, the converse is not so unthinkable as to justify our
writirig into the Act a jurisdictional exclusion where none now exists.
Moreover we could not justify denying coverage of the Act to nonteaching
as well as faculty employees, which would be the result of a finding of no
jurisdiction.
Id. at 556, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2037. The court also dismissed Wentworth's argument that
the Board erred by proceeding in college cases via adjudication rather than rulemaking,
noting that while rulemaking may have been a preferable course, the Board did not
abuse its authority by electing the former approach. Id.
in Id. at 556.89 L.R.R.M. at 2037.
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could not rule on the status of all faculty everywhere, as if it were a
legislature, and that on the facts of the case before it, the Board was
justified in refusing to consider faculty either as supervisory or as
managerial employees. The court supported this view by pointing to
its findings that the authority structure at Wentworth was indeed
hierarchical, and that there was no significant faculty impact on policy
or managerial matters."' As such, the court was apparently unwilling
to place very much emphasis on the possible adverse effects of collec-
tive bargaining on collegiality. The Court expressly declined to com-
ment generally on the Board's "developing views on the significance
of a substantial faculty role in decisions on curricula, admissions, hir-
ing degree requirements, and other educational policy matters."" 5
The Wentworth decision appears to clash with the Board's refusal
to exclude department chairmen as supervisors where their authority
is shared with faculty. The Court in Wentworth indicated that faculty
were employees because they did not possess significant supervisory
or managerial authority. By contrast, the Board, in such decisions as
Fordham 1 and University of Miami indicated that its unwillingness to
exclude department chairmen from the faculty unit on the basis of
supervisory status was based on the fact that the chairmen were not
effective supervisors since their supervisory duties were shared with
the faculty."a The Board's position on department chairmen and the
First Circuit's position on faculty as employees are thus premised on
two different assumptions which are seemingly very difficult to recon-
cile. This dichotomy should be resolved by a recognition that "shared
authority" is a consequence of a chairman's style of management and
personal proclivity, and that in most institutions the department
chairman does possess the authority to grant to, or withhold from
other faculty members the right to participate with him in decision-
making functions in the personnel area. It is submitted that when it
can be determined by an analysis of departmental prerogatives that
the department, whether through the chairman or in concert with
him, can effectively recommend to administration action in such mat-
ters as renewal, non-renewal, evaluation, tenure, or promotion, a pre-
sumption should be created by Board rule that the authority for such
recommendations flows from the chairman, whether the chairman is
elected or appointed. Therefore, under these circumstances, the
chairman would presumptively be considered a "supervisor" under
the Act. Such a presumption would be rebuttable, but only on a show-
ing that delegation of such authority by the Board of Trustees or
Administration has been made directly to the departmental faculty as
an entity, and not to the chairman to be distributed as he sees fit. Of
course, if it can be proven that the delegation is to the department at
' 5 ' /d. at 557,,89 L.R.R.M. at 2038.
155 Id. The court continued by noting that In'either do we suggest that faculty
members with different relationships and status than those herein are necessarily in-
cluded employees under the Act." Al. at 558, 89 L.R.R.M. 2038.
15° See discussion Part II, Section A(1), supra.
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large, the Wentworth issue of whether faculty are "employees" under
the Act must be answered.
C. Scope of the Unit
( I) Multi-Campus Units
Many universities operate out of more than one campus. The
Board faced the issue of multi-campus units in Fairleigh Dickinson Uni-
versity (FDU). 157 FDU operates three major campuses in New Jersey,
located in Rutherford, Madison and Teaneck, and has additional
facilities at two other locations. Since the University is centralized in
one governing body and the faculty at the three campuses are subject
to the same terms and conditions of employment, the American As-
sociation of University Professors (AAUP) and the University argued
for a University-wide unit. The American Federation of Teachers
(AFT) sought a unit limited to the Teaneck campus on the grounds
that the Teaneck campus consisted of a homogeneous identifiable
group of faculty members with sufficient community of interest to
comprise an appropriate bargaining unit.' 58 The Board listed the fol-
lowing factors to be considered where an employer operated a
number of facilities: prior bargaining history; centralization of man-
agement, particularly in regard to labor relations; extent of employee
interchange; degree of interdependence or autonomy of facilities; dif-
ferences or sinillarities in skills and functions of the employees; and
geographical location of the facilities in relation to each other. 15 "
After considering these factors; the Board rejected the, AFT's position
and held that a unit limited to the Teaneck campus would be inap-
propriate; In support of this position, the Board noted that there was
a substantial community of interest shared by all the faculty on the
three campuses. This finding was based on the facts that the campus
facilities were centralized and integrated, the wages, hours, and condi-
157 205 N.L.R.B. 673, 84 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1973).
'" M. at 673, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1033. The Board noted that conditions of employ-
ment such as minimum starting salaries, teaching hours, conditions for attaining pro-
motions and tenure, and fringe benefits were identical for all faculty members, regard-
less of the campus at which they were located, and that none of these basic conditions
of employment could be changed or modified at the campus or college level In addi-
tion, all college budgets were subject to modifications predicated on the decisions of the
central administration in relation to the overall budget. Though a minimum representa-
tion for each college on the Faculty Senate was guaranteed, representatives were chosen
without regard to location. During the previous four years there had been approxi-
mately 16 instances where a member of the faculty transferred or temporarily inter-
changed from one campus to another. Further, the evidence indicated that there were
several members of the faculty who taught courses at more than one campus. The three
main campuses were all within forty miles of each other, and during the two years im-
mediately preceding the filing of the petitions, a tri-campus faculty committee
negotiated with the University for salary increases Id. at 673-74, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1034.
15° Id. at 674-75, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1034.
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tions of employment were identical on all campuses, and the rules and
procedures relating to promotion and tenure were also
standardized.'"°
When the campuses involved have, in fact, lacked centralization
and integration the Board has recognized separate units based on
campus assignment. Thus, in Goddard College,'" the Board excluded
from the unit the faculty of the Goddard:Cambridge graduate pro-
gram in social change where the graduate program was located in
Cambridge, Massachusetts and the Main campus of the College was
located in Plainfield, Vermont. The Board also took into considera-
tion the semi-autonomous nature of the Cambridge program. The
Cambridge-based faculty worked solely in Cambridge, and had little,
if any, direct contact with Plainfield-based faculty; had no interchange
with faculty members in other departments; and did not participate in
any college committees other than those affecting the Cambridge
program.' 62
(2) Separate Units for Graduate Professional Schools
a. Law Schools. The existence of a sufficiently distinct commun-
ity of interests has prompted the Board to find separate units appro-
priate for law schools. In Fordham 0 63 the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP) petitioned to represent a unit which ex-
cluded the Law School, while the Law School Bargaining Committee
sought to represent the Law School in a separate unit. 189 The Board
noted that while a university-wide unit of professional employees had
been found appropriate in C.W. Post, the operation of the Law School
here involved was not "so highly integrated with that of the remain-
der of the University as to compel a finding that an overall unit alone
is appropriate."'" Inasmuch as there was no bargaining history on a
'°° Id. at 675, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1035.
' 6 ' 216 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 88 L.R.R.M. 1228 (1975).
'0 1d. at 	 , 88 L.R.R.M. at 1230. Compare Mercy Hospitals of Sacramento, 217
N.L.R.B. No. 131, 89 L.R.R.M. 1097, 1098-99 (1975), where the Board found appro-
priate an overall unit for two hospitals located 13 miles apart.
1" 193 N.L.R.B. 134, 78 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1971).
'"Id. at 134, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1178-79. The University argued against the exclu-
sion of the Law School from the overall bargaining unit. Id.
'"Id. at 137, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1181. The Board noted many factors which distin-
guished the Law School from the general University community. The Law School oper-
ated out of a separate building, with other schools never using the Law School's class-
rooms and rarely using its facilities. Its faculty had never taught courses independently
in any other schools, nor did other faculty ever teach at the Law School. Fifty-seven
percent of the Law School faculty were full professors compared to only twenty percent
for the rest of the University; and the Law School faculty were eligible for tenure after
only three years, as opposed to seven for other faculty. Furthermore, Law School fac-
ulty averaged higher salaries than other faculty because private law firm rates were
taken into consideration in setting these salaries. Furthermore, the New York Court of
Appeals regulates admission to law practice in New York and had issued rules and reg-
ulations concerning legal education in the state. In addition, the Law School was a
member of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS)• and both the AALS and
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broader basis and considering the fact that no labor organization
sought to include the Law School in an overall unit, the Board found
a separate unit appropriate. In so ruling, the Board stressed that the
specialized training, the separate location, different calendar and lack
of interchange were critical factors in excluding the school from a
university-wide unit.'66
In Syracuse University,'" the AAUP sought a university-wide
unit, while a special law faculty group sought separate representation
for the Law School.'" For the first time, two unions were seeking to
represent a law school. The Board found the Syracuse situation to be
in all critical aspects similar to the situation in Fordham where the
Board had found appropriate a separate unit of law faculty.'" The
Board, however, further noted that the industrial model for unit de-
terminations developed by the Board under the Act was often inap-
propriate in the university area since in the educational field a group
of faculty often have an intellectual allegiance to a particular disci-
pline that transcends economic concerns. Because of this special charac-
ter of university faculty, the Board asserted that it must guard the
rights of minority groups whose intellectual interests differed from
those of the general faculty.'" Despite these considerations, the
Board found that a unit of all faculty could be appropriate here.
While the Law School faculty was an identifiable group of employees
with a community of interest which was not submerged in the broader
community of interest shared with the other University faculty mem-
bers, the Law School faculty did, in fact, share those broad interests
with the University faculty. In fashioning a remedy for the situation
in which either separate or full faculty units would be appropriate,
the Board opted for a self-determination election to ascertain whether
the law faculty should be represented in the overall unit, should have
separate representation, or should be unrepresented regardless of the
choice of the University faculty as a whole."'
In light of the recent university unit determination cases involv-
ing petitions for separate units of law school faculty, it is clear that the
Board has identified various operating factors which should be pres-
ent if a petition for a separate law school unit is to be successful. They
the N.Y. Court of Appeals promulgated detailed regulations, some of which affected
the terms and conditions of employment at the Law School, including hours during
which classes could be held, length of class periods, faculty/student ratios, faculty offices
and maximum teaching loads. Finally, the Law School operated on a different calendar
than the rest of the University. Id. at 136,78 L.R.R.M. at 1180-81.
'" Id. The Board has followed its Fordham ruling in Catholic Univ., 201 N.L.R.B.
929, 82 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1973), and University- of San Francisco, 207 N.L.R.B. 12, 84
L.R.R.M. 1403 (1973), cases involving similar facts as Ford/tam.
' 204 N.L.R.B. 641,83 L.R.R.M. 1373 (1973).
'I° Id. at 641, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1374.
'°°/d. at 644,83 L.R.R.M. at 1376.
'" Id. at 693-49, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1376.
"' Id. The Board again directed a self-determination election in New York Univ.,
205 N.L.R.B. at 4, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1550.
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include: exclusive occupancy of a separate building; mandatory com-
pliance with ABA and AALS accreditation standards; autonomous
academic calendar; higher faculty salaries; shorter tenure eligibility
period; higher percentage of tenured faculty; and operational
independence.'" Nevertheless, while the existence of these operating
factors plays an important role in determining whether the Board es-
tablishes a separate law school unit, the Board's overriding concern
seems to be the preservation of the autonomy of special faculty
groups whose intellectual interest would be detrimentally submerged
if they were to be included in a general university faculty group; and
as such, the absence of some of these factors may not prove detrimen-
tal to a separate unit petition.
b. Other Graduate Professional Schools. In a footnote, the Board in
Fordham I, observed that many of the factors set forth concerning
Fordham's law school were equally applicable to the University's other
professional schools." 3 While it was unnecessary for the Board in
Fordham I to reach the merits in passing on the appropriateness of
granting separate unit status to the faculty of a professional school
other than a law school,'" this question has been elsewhere consid-
ered. In University of Miami, the Board excluded the Schools of
Medicine and Marine Biology as well as the Law School from the
larger University faculty unit.'" While there was some evidence
'"See University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634, 635, 87 L.R.R.M. 1634, 1637
(1974).
us The Board has stressed the following factors as grounds for excluding a law
school from the university unit: specialized training, separate location, different
academic calendar, lack of interchange, different tenure eligibility rules, and separate
accreditation.
" 4 In Fordham I no party sought a separate unit for any professional schools
other than the Law School. 193 N.L.R.B. at 137 n.I2, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1181 n.12. See alto
Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 673, 84 L.R.R.M. 1033. In Fairleigh Dickinson,
the AFT argued that the Dental School should be excluded from the unit. The AAUP
and University argued for its inclusion. Id. at 676, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1036.
The Dental School was located across the river from the University's Teaneck,
New jersey campus, occupying a building used almost entirely for dental instruction.
Dental faculty served on the University Faculty Senate and had University-wide griev-
ance procedures available to them. All University personnel policies applied with equal
force to the dental faculty. Several courses were taught by the dental faculty in conjunc-
tion with faculty members from the Science and Engineering School.
On the other hand, a substantial number of its full-time faculty were dentists
whose average salaries were substantially higher than their faculty counterparts else-
where in the University. Dental faculty did not participate on a regular basis in general
University governance, and the Dental School was scrutinized by separate outside ac-
crediting bodies. Id. at 675-76, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1035. Furthermore, there was no func-
tional integration between the Dental School and the other colleges, and the thrust of
teaching in that school "(teaching a specific profession)" was entirely different from the
other colleges "whose basic goals are student matriculation within the framework of a .
much broader academic discipline." Id. at 676, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1036.
The Board ruled that while such factors could support a separate unit limited to
the faculty of the Dental School, as no labor organization seeks to represent them
separately, we shall include the dental faculty in the overall unit." Id.
'" 213 N.L.R.B. at 636-37, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1637-39.
963
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
militating against the Board's holding,'" on balance, a number of fac-
tors persuaded the Board to grant separate unit status. The School of
Medicine, first of all, was ten miles from the main campus, based on a
medical complex of hospitals, clinics and institutes. Additionally, the
Board noted that the 577 full-time faculty at the Medical School were
responsible for the education of 640 students, while at the main cam-
pus, 520 faculty served the needs of 14,000-plus students. Further,
more than 300 among the medical faculty were practicing physicians,
devoting a substantial portion of their time to patient care. Other con-
siderations included the facts that: the Medical School operated on a
different school calendar than the rest of the University; the faculty
had 12-month instead of 9-month contracts; and their average salaries
were substantially larger than those of other faculty.'" A final factor
found significant by the Board concerned financing. Due to the
availability of medical research and education grants, and to the large
amount of income generated by patient-care activities, the salaries for
the medical faculty came for the most part, from non-University
sources.' 78
 Thus, it is apparent from the Miami decision that the
Board is willing to apply its separate law school unit analysis to other
graduate professional schools.
Commentary
The Board is assured of broad discretion in fashioning units
which will effectuate the purpose of the Act; nonetheless, with the ex-
clusion of part-time faculty and the faculty of graduate professional
schools, it appears that the Board is tending towards over-
fragmentation in college cases. The Board's treatment of graduate
professional schools has involved the analysis of two issues: whether
separate representation is appropriate, and whether a vote for sepa-
rate non-representation is justified.
The Board in Syracuse reasoned that the law faculty had a "spe-
cial allegiance" to their particular discipline' which transcended their
community of interest with the University faculty as a whole. Al-
though such allegiance would not justify disenfranchisement from col-
lective bargaining, the majority of the Board suggested that the law
faculty deserved the protection of special procedures:
Granting a voice merely in determining whether such a
group shall be swallowed up by the collective body or shall
have separate representation will not answer. Rather, it re-
quires yet another choice, that of standing alone without
17. The Medical School faculty followed University policies and guidelines, had
representation on the University Senate, and received standard fringe benefits. Also,
there was a limited degree of faculty interchange (20-25 medical faculty out of 577 hav-
ing taught at the main campus), and the Medical School faculty also helped to train
student nurses from the University's Nursing School. Id. at 635, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1638.
"'Id. at 635-36, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1638.
"8 /d. at 636, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1638.
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representation regardless of the choice of the university
body as a whole.'"
The special procedure devised by the majority not only allowed the
Law School faculty to vote on whether to be included in a
University-wide unit but also provided a procedure by which the Law
School faculty, should it desire to be treated separately, could opt for
representation by one of the associations or for no representation.ls°
This special procedure was different than the "Globe" procedure
under which a minority group of skilled employees is allowed to vote
for separate representation; however, if such separate representation
is defeated by a majority of the skilled employees, then those votes in
favor of representation in the larger group are counted in the general
representation elections's' Members Fanning and Penello in dissent
argued that the existing "Globe" election procedure not only provided
adequate protection for the law faculty's special interest, but also, in
contrast to the proposed procedure, provided for at least some form
of employee representation.''
The Board has not consistently applied its principles of separate
representation and separate non-representation in cases involving
graduate schools other than law schools. Logically, the majority's
rationale in Syracuse for separate non-representation would seem to
apply in instances where no labor organization sought separate rep-
resentation for a particular graduate faculty unit. The fact that the
option for separate representation is unavailable should not alter the
availability of the other two options—non-representation or
university-wide representation. Yet in Fairleigh Dickinson University,"3
179 204 N.L.R.B. at 643, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1376.
"Id. at 644,83 L.R.R.M. at 1376-77.
"In a typical 'Globe' election, employees vote in two groups, with the minority
group of skilled employees having the option of voting for representation in a separate
unit. If separate representation is not favored by the majority in the skilled unit, then
their votes are pooled with those of the other voting group to determine the question
of representation in the overall unit. Thus, a 'Globe' election here would separate the
faculty into 2 voting groups—one composed of the law faculty, the other consisting of
the remainder of the faculty. The law faculty would vote whether it desired representa-
tion by the Law Faculty Association, which seeks the separate unit, by the AAUP, or by
neither. If a majority of the law faculty did not select separate representation by the
Law Faculty Association, then their votes would be pooled with those of the other fac-
ulty members to determine representation in the resulting overall unit. In that circum-
stance, the votes of the law faculty would be accorded their normal weight, whether for
or against representation, save those votes for the Law Faculty Association, which would
not be counted for or against representation in the overall unit." Id. at 645 n.11, 83
L.R.R.M. at 1378 n.11 (dissenting opinion).
m Id. at 645, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1378. The dissenters also queried whether the
majority's concern for the protection of special interests would carry over into the in-
dustrial sector since within the industrial sector craftsmen are arguably more clearly dis-
tinct from unskilled workers than law faculty are from their fellow university faculty
members. Id.
1113 205 N.L.R.B. 673, 84 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1973). For a discussion of the Fairleigh
Dickinson decision see note 174 supra.
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the Board approved a unit which included the School of Dentistry,
without affording the school's faculty the choice of separate non-
representation. The Board based its decision on the fact that no labor
organization sought to represent the school separately, while the
AAUP was willing to represent it as a part of the overall unit.' 84 From
this decision, it appears that the Board is concluding that dentists, un-
like lawyers, do not deserve "another choice, that of standing alone
without representation, regardless of the choice of the University
body as a whole." Similarly, in New York University Medical Center 185 the
Board refused to allow a petition to represent a unit of clinical and
teaching psychiatrists on the grounds that any separate community of
interest that they enjoyed had been largely submerged in the broader
community of interest they shared with other physicians and (possibly)
other "allied" professionals in the health care industry.' 86 As such, the
Board, when dealing with medical faculty as opposed to legal faculty,
seems to be less sensitive to the existence of any "special allegiance"
that would warrant separate unit status.
In analyzing what seems to be inherent inconsistencies in the
Board's treatment of legal faculty and their medical counterparts, it is
interesting to note that Congress has expressly noted its concern over
the possibility of over-fragmentation in the health care industry.' 87
Thus, the Board's unwillingness to provide separate unit status for
medical faculty may merely be an example of Board implementation
of expressed congressional policies. Thus, there seemingly is a policy
basis from which to conclude that the Board's concern for establishing
effective and stable bargaining units should override its desire to
maintain the autonomy of a so-called "second profession." It may be,
then, that the Board's treatment of legal faculty could well change
with respect to the granting of separate unit status.
D. Other Professionals
Congress has stated that no bargaining unit which includes both
professional employees and non-professionals is appropriate unless a
majority of the professionals to be included in the unit vote for the
1 " See note 174 supra.
In 217 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 89 L.R.R.M. 1045 (1975).
In Id. at 	 , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1049.
"See 120 CONG. REC. S. 6940 (1974); 120 CONC. REC. S. 7311 (1974). Although
the Board usually accords great weight to Congress' expressed concern over the possi-
ble proliferation of bargaining units in the Health Care industry, it has nonetheless
found that registered nurses have a "singular community of interest" separate from
other health care professionals, due in large part to their long history of separate rep-
resentation. See Gnadden Huetten Memorial Hospital, 219 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 89
L.R.R.M. 1761, 1762 (1975); Dominican Santa Cruz Hospital, 218 N.L.R.B. No. 182, 89
L.R.R.M. 1504, 1505-06 (1975); Mercy Hospitals of Sacramento, 217 N.L.R.B. No. 131,
89 L.R.R.M. 1097, 1099.1101 (1975).
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non-professionals' inclusion.'" In general terms, Congress has de-
fined a "professional employee" in Section 2(12) of the Act as one
whose work is predominantly of an intellectual nature, involves the
exercise of discretion, is not of such character as to create a product
that can be standardized, and requires knowledge of the type usually
obtainable only through a prolonged course of specialized instruction.
Also included in the definition is an employee who has completed a
specialized intellectual course of instruction, and who is presently
working under the supervision of a professional to qualify himself to
become a professional.'" While no claim has been advanced that fac-
ulty are not professional employees, there are certain non-teaching
employees in the university structure whose status as professionals is
less clear. Moreover, even when these non-teachers are classified as
professionals, there often remains the question whether it is proper to
include them in a unit with faculty.
(1) Classification of Non-Teaching Employees
a. Librarians. Librarians are often the largest body of non-
teaching professionals on campus. As their job ordinarily requires
"knowledge of an advanced type ... acquired by a prolonged course
of specialized intellectual instruction," their professional status is not
usually in question. Not all librarians are, however, required to hold
advanced degrees; where this is the case, their status as professionals
can be successfully challenged. Thus, in Endicott Collegen° four li-
brarians and one cataloger were excluded from a faculty bargaining
unit. In that case, the librarians and cataloger did not hold faculty
rank, handled routine receipt and discharge of books and answered
"" Section 9(b)(I) of the Act provides:
[T]he Board shall not (I) decide that any unit is appropriate ... if such
unit includes both professional employees and employees who are not pro-
fessional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote
for inclusion in such unit.
"v 29 U.S.C. § 152(12). "Professional employee" is defined in Section 2(12) of the
Act as:
(a) Any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual
and varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical,
or physical work, (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and
judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the output pro-
duced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a
given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a
field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of
specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher
learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education
or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine
mental, manual, or physical processes; or
(b) Any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized
intellectual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a),
and (ii) is performing related work under the supervison of a professional
person to qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined in
paragraph (a).
"V Endicott Junior College. Case No. 1-RC-12,672 (Sept. 12, 1973).
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student reference questions. Moreover, the job requirements for the
librarian position could be learned in about two weeks of in-service
training. Accordingly, these individuals were not included in the
unit."'
b. Guidance Counselors. Guidance counselors are more likely to
be classed as professional employees than academic and admissions
counselors in that they deal with the students' psychological and emo-
tional problems. Further, they often hold advanced degrees in the
field of psychology.' 92 However, academic and admissions counselors
ordinarily do not hold degrees in a specialized area directly related to
their work. Based on this fact, the Board in C.W. Post would not clas-
sify the academic and admissions counselors as professionals and
therefore excluded them from the faculty unit. In reaching this con-
clusion, the Board noted that Congress' definition of a "professional
employee" requires that the duties performed be related to a science
or discipline the study of which involves an advanced, prolonged
course of specialized instruction. In C.W. Post the Board asserted that
all that was required of academic or admissions counselors was a
knowledge of the school; accordingly, it denied those counselors pro-
fessional status.' 93
c. Coaches. Athletic coaches were found to be professional em-
ployees in Manhattan College' 94 based on the fact that all had academic
degrees and all engaged in teaching. 195 Similarly, members of the de-
partment of physical education were classed as professionals in
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute,'" where the record established that
every one of them did some teaching.'" However, in University of
Miami coaches were held not to be professionals inasmuch as their
"M. at
"C.W. Post, 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 908, 77 L.R.R.M. 1001, 1005 (1971);
Northeastern, 218 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 89 L.R.R.M. 1862, 1869 (1975).
" As to academic and admission counselors, the Board noted ihatRie know-
ledge they are required to possess and the duties they perform are not related to a dis-
cipline or field of science, but require only a knowledge of the Center's curriculum and
services."C. W. Post, 189 N.L.R.B. at 908, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1005.
' 195 N.L.R.B. 65, 79 L.R.R.M. 1253 (1972).
" In that decision the Board described the coaches and their jobs:
IAN have academic degrees and at least one has a master's degree. They
are engaged in substantial part in teaching physical and mental skills,
utilizing educationally acquired knowledge of their specialty. In short,
their jobs might well be characterized as the practice of a specialized form
of physical education. The fact that their activities relate to an extracur-
ricular matter, while perhaps of some importance to the students, is less
significant in classifying the nature . of the work. We think that these
coaches qualify as professional employees under Section 2(12) of the Act.
Id. at 66, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1255.
" 8 218 N.L.R.B. No. 220, 89 L.R.R.M. 1844 (1975).
"Id. at 	 , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1849.
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coaching duties did not require advanced degrees and they did no
teaching.'"
d. Research Personnel. Research personnel are generally held to
be professional employees if they are more than mere techniciansn"
since they can usually be included under that part of Congress' defini-
tion which refers to employees who have completed advanced studies
but are working under the supervision of a professional in order to
become a professional. Often times, however, such personnel may not
be employees of the institution. It is quite usual for research person-
nel who are working on grant-funded projects to be paid by the in-
stitution, covered by its insurance and entitled to some fringe benefits.
However, the institution does not always have control over the grant
monies, in which case, the research personnel may be deemed not its
employees.200
e. Graduate Students. In Leland Stanford Junior Universily20' the
Board held that graduate students who were paid for doing research
were not professional employees, but were metely students receiving a
form of financial 'aid. The graduate students were paid the same
amount regardless of the time they actually worked; they were not
expected to "produce" anything of value; and they were, in effect,
being paid for doing what was required of them to earn their
degrees.'" Previously, in Adelphi University, the graduate students
(teaching and research assistants) were excluded from the unit on a
different ground; namely, that as students they lacked a sufficient
community of interest with the faculty. The Board did not hold that
the students were not employees—and in fact this would have been
more difficult than in Stanford, since in Adelphi the graduate assistants
had defined duties, varied salary structures, and definite work output
requirements.203 However, the question of graduate student status
may have ultimately been resolved by the Board's recent decision on
the employee status of medical interns.
Graduate assistants may be equated to interns and residents in
hospital situations in terms of the nature of their duties, training, sal-
ary structures and work requirements. Both graduate assistants and
interns may be said to be understudying professionals—not yet at the
terminal level of study needed to meet the requirements of Section
2(12) (b) of the Act. Significantly, in the recent decision of Cedars-Sinai
In 213 NLRB at 639,87 L.R.R.M. at 1641.
in See, for example, C.W. Post, 189 N.L.R.B. at 906-07, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1004-05.
"" Compare, Fordham I, 193 N.L.R.B. at 136, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1180 (research assist-
ants not employees), with Northeastern, 218 N.L.R.B. at	 , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1870-71 (re-
search assistants professional employees).
20' 214 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 87 L.R.R.M. 1519 (1974).
2" Id. at	 , 87 L.R.R.M. at 1520-21.
1" 195 N.L.R.B. at 690, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1548.
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Medical Center"' the Board held that interns and residents were not
employees within• the meaning of the Act but rather were primarily
students engaged in graduate educational training. Thus, the stu-
dents' status as "professionals" is foreclosed, since this issue would
only be confronted if initial employee status were found. Since the
case for finding employee status of hospital housestaff is much
stronger than graduate assistants in that the interns receive generally
higher rates of pay, have greater status and work responsibilities, are
eligible for fringe benefits, and experience far more continuity of
employment than graduate assistants, it would appear, for the sake of
consistency, that the Board should not find that graduate assistants
are employees under the Act.
(2) Unit Placement
As noted above, librarians, athletic coaches, counselors, and re-
search personnel who are not graduate assistants may all qualify as
professional employees. Once this hurdle is overcome, the remaining
issue is whether they should be placed in faculty units.
Librarians have been included in units with full-time faculty, 2 °5
unless either supervisory status 206 or lack of professional status is
found.2 ° 7 While the librarians are, as a general rule, included in the
faculty unit, the Board noted the following differences between li-
brarians and faculty in New York University:
Professional librarians are titled curator, associate curator,
assistant curator, or library associate in descending order of
rank. Unlike faculty, the function of a librarian may change
with title, and promotion may depend on the existence of a
vacancy. Further distinguishing librarians from faculty are
their regular workweek; retirement age; tenure require-
ments; separate grievance procedure; lack of proportional
representation in the university senate (though the dean of
libraries, like other deans, is a member); and, perhaps more
2" 223 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 91 L.R.R.M. 1398, 1400, rehearing den., 224 N.L.R.B.
No. 90, 92 L.R.R.M. 1309 (1976). In determining that the interns were primarily stu-
dents, the Board noted that an internship was a requirement for the state examination
for licensing. The Board further noted that while the interns spent a large portion of
their time in direct patient care, such direct contact was the only viable learning process
for a medical student. Moreover, the Board emphasized the fact that an intern's com-
pensation was merely a living allowance and as such bore no relationship to the number
of hours worked. Also, the Board noted that the purpose of the internship programs
was educational and not designed to meet the staffing needs of the hospital. Finally, the
Board noted that few interns at Cedars-Sinai established an employment relationship
with the hospital upon completion of their internship thus indicating the educational
nature of the program. Id. at , 91 L.R.R.M. at 1400.
905 But see, Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. No. 169, 91 L.R.R.M. 1017 (1975).
2 " See, for example, Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 89 L.R.R.M. 1862,
1869-70 (1975).
'" See, for example, Endicott Junior College, Case No. I-RC-12,672 (Sept. 12,
1973).
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basically, the fact that they are not considered faculty. 2 ° 8
Despite these differences, the Board held that the librarians shared a
sufficient community of interest with faculty, as a "closely allied pro-
fessional group whose ultimate function, aiding and furthering the
educational and scholarly goals of the University, converges with that
of the faculty, though pursued through different means and in a dif-
ferent manner." 2"
The Board has also included other non-teaching professional
personnel in the faculty unit when it has found a sufficient commun-
ity of interest between those non-teachers and the faculty. Thus, ath-
letic coaches have been included with the faculty when found to be
professional employees and when further found to share many of the
same benefits of the other employees in the unit. 21 ° The existence of
similar benefits has also been determinative in the case of research
assistants."'
Those personnel who perform administrative as well as teaching
functions have also been included in the unit. In Florida Southern
College, 2 " for example, such personnel as the college chaplain, the as-
sistant dean of academic affairs, the publications editor, and the direc-
tor of athletics were included in the unit. The Board indicated that
these administrative personnel enjoyed faculty status and spent a sub-
stantial portion of their time as professionals performing functions
similar to those of the full-time faculty. 2 " Thus, in dealing with the
question of the inclusion of non-teaching personnel in the full-time
faculty unit, the Board has focused primarily on the existence of a
community of interest among the non-teachers and the faculty.
Furthermore, it would seem that, in finding a community of interest,
the Board has relied heavily on the existence of similar benefits or the
availability of similar promotions such as tenure.
(3) Further Distinctions Among Faculty
In University of Miami, the Board noted that full-time faculty in-
cluded those with regular, term and indefinite appointments. In that
case, the Board found the differences between the three groups to be:
regular appointments are all to tenured or tenure-earning positions,
while term appointments are made for a specific period and generally
are not teriure-earning. Indefinite appointments continue from year
to year, and also provide no opportunity for tenure. The Board, how-
toe 205 N.L.R.B. at 8, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1553.
822 Id.
2 " Manhattan College, 195 N.L.R.B. at 66, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1255.
2" Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. at 	 , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1871. The Board
has, however, included these assistants merely on the basis of their eligibility for tenure,
C.W. Post, 189 N.L.R.B. at 907, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1004, and even on the basis of a felt
community of interest. Rensselaer, 218 N.L.R.B. at , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1848.
2'Y
	 N.L.R.B. 888, 80 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1972).
213 /d. at 890, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1164.
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ever, noted that except for tenure, the functions, responsibilities, and
benefits of the three classes were very similar. 214 As such, the Board
found that the similarities represented a sufficient basis for finding a
community of interest among the three groups, and, therefore, in
spite of their differences the Board placed all full-time faculty in the
same unit. 215
Although the community of interest concept has provided the
basis for including in the full-time faculty unit not only non-teaching
personnel but also term and indefinite appointed faculty, this
rationale has not controlled when the Board has confronted the ques-
tion of including visiting faculty. The Board in Goddard College 216 ex-
cluded visiting faculty from the full-time faculty unit even though the
visiting faculty worked a full-time load, received the same pay and
benefits, and were entitled to full participation in governance, includ-
ing voting privileges. The Board based its decision on the ground that
the visiting faculty had no reasonable expectancy of reemployment, in
that they only occasionally stayed more than one year and only five to
ten percent were offered permanent faculty positions. 217 This treat-
ment of visiting faculty is seemingly inconsistent with the Board's posi-
tion that terminal contract faculty members should be included in the
unit. Terminal contract faculty are employees who, at the time of the
election, have been notified that they will not be rehired at the expira-
tion of their contracts. 2 ' 8 Concerning terminal contract faculty, the
Board has stated that it will not inquire into their expectancy of em-
ployment beyond ,the date of the election. The Board has therefore
included these terminal faculty in units of full-time faculty based on a
finding of a substantial community of interest. 2 " As defined above,
however, terminal contract faculty members have a status strikingly
similar to that of visiting faculty. Therefore, the inconsistent treat-
ment of visiting faculty and terminal contract faculty is suspect.
1" 213 N.L.R.B. at 638, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1640.
m Id., 87 L.R.R.M. at 1641. Faculty are also ranked according to their qualifica-
tions, and salaries are scaled according to rank. Quite commonly, there are four ranks:
Full professor, associate professor, assistant professor, and instructor. See, for example,
Adelphi Uniy., 195 N.L:R.B. at 639, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1547; G.W. Post, 189 N.L.R.B. at
905, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1002.
2" 216 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 88 L.R.R.M. 1228 (1975).
2 " 216 N.L.R.B. at 	 , 88 L.R.R.M. at 1229. The Board relied on General
American Transp. Corp., 187 N.L.R.B. 120, 75 L.R.R.M. 1531 (1970), which involved a
challenge to the ballot of an employee who had taken a leave of absence from his job in
order to obtain a teaching degree. The leave was granted on condition he return as a
temporary employee. Shortly before the election, the employee gave several months'
notice of his intent to terminate employment. The Board held he did not share a suffi-
cient community of interest with the voting group, in that he was a temporary em-
ployee without a reasonable expectancy of future employment in the voting group. Id.
at 120-21, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1532.
Citing Goddard, the Regional Director for Region One excluded visiting faculty
from the unit in Trustees of Boston Univ., Case No. 1-RC-13,564 (April 17, 1975).
III Manhattan College, 195 N.L.R.B. at 66, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1253.
"° E.g., Manhattan College, 195 N.L.R.B. at 66, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1253.
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(4) Faculty As Individual Supervisors
Although the Board has held that the faculty collectively cannot
be found to assume supervisory status,22° there remains the question
of whether individual faculty who direct the work of graduate assist-
ants or who direct research projects should be found to be super-
visors. The Board has held that faculty who direct the work of
graduate assistants are not, as a result, imbued with supervisory
status."' The Board's position on this issue stems from its belief that
the faculty and graduate assistants maintain a teacher-student rather
than an employer-employee relationship, since the faculty member
who directs a particular graduate assistant in his work also is usually
directing that graduate student's studies.222
Of some interest is the Board's handling of so-called principal
investigators—those faculty who are working on and directing re-
search projects. In making the determination whether to exclude
principal investigators from the faculty unit based on the existence of
supervisory authority, the Board has focused on the status of the re-
search assistants that these investigators direct. Thus, when the Board
has ruled that the research assistants were not employees of the uni-
versity, it .has, accordingly, rejected the argument that the inves-
tigators are supervisors.223 However, when the Board has found the
research assistants to be employees of the university"' the Board,
without even applying the "50%" rule, has found the investigators to
be supervisors, and has thereby excluded them not only when the re-
search assistants were included in the faculty unit225 but also when the
assistants were excluded from the unit.22° Finally, since most of the
research projects involving faculty members as principal investigators
continue usually for only one or two years, the Board's exclusion of
these faculty members during the pendency of their research results
in a situation where various faculty members pop in and out of the
bargaining unit as their grants issue or expire. Thus, the Board's ex-
clusion of principal investigators as supervisors during the research
periods has given rise to the phrase "popcorn unit."227
2" See discussion of Collective Authority, text at notes 145-51 supra.
221 Ford/tam I, 193 N.L.R.B. at 135-36, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1180.
"'Id. See also New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. at 8, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1554 (where
the Board found the directing faculty not to be supervisors and was also able to rely on
the "50%" rule to find similarly that the challenged faculty should be included).
223 Ford/tam I, 193 N.LR.B. at 136,78 L.R.R.M. at 1180. The basis for determin-
ing that the research assistants were not employees of the University in Ford/tam I was
that the grant funds were administered directly by the granting agency. Id. To the same
effect, see New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. at 9, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1554.
224 E.g., Northeastern, 218 N.L.R.B. at 	 , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1870; Rensselaer, 218
N.L.R.B. at 	 , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1848. The basis for finding the research assistants to
be employees of the university was that the university administered the grant funds.
222 Northeastern, 218 N.L.R.B. at
	 , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1870; Rensselaer, 218 N.L.R.B.
at 	 , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1848.
2" Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. No. 169, 91 L.R.R.M. 1017, 1021 (1975).
222 Northeastern, 218 N.L.R.B. at
	 .89 L.R.R.M. at 1870.
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Commentary
The above examination of some of the Board's unit determina-
tions in the university sector indicates that the Board may have aban-
doned a functional approach to unit placement in higher education,
resulting in an overfragmentation of bargaining units in the university
structure. Part-time faculty are excluded, for example, even though
their function, teaching, is the same as that of full-time faculty. Law
faculty are permitted to vote for separate non-representation even
though they are employed as teachers, not as lawyers. Graduate stu-
dents are excluded because theirs is primarily a student-teacher rather
than an employment relationship. Ironically, librarians and counsel-
lors are included because their ultimate function, (i.e. education) con-
verges with that of full-time faculty. These results reveal a type of in-
consistency on the part of the Board which is even more troublesome
than that which arises from the Board's application of the traditional
"community of interest" rationale.
In light of the inconsistences, it may well be asked whether the
Board has performed its function of establishing units "directly rele-
vant to the circumstances of collective bargaining . "229 On one hand,
the Board appears to be seeking to avoid fragmentation, with the re-
sulting instability and inefficiency in collective bargaining, by includ-
ing non-teaching professionals in the unit. Yet, on the other hand, its
policy in regard to part-time faculty and graduate professional schools
has evoked sharp criticism that it is over-fragmenting the unit to the
detriment of employee bargaining power. 229 This difficulty arises
primarily from the Board's failure to articulate a reliable "community
of interest" test, which in turn stems, at least in part, from the lack of
certainty regarding what will be deemed mandatory subjects of
bargaining. 230
The Board's treatment of clinical and teaching psychiatrists in
New York University Medical Center provides an interesting comparison
to the Board's decision, in the university area and at the same time,
perhaps provides a basis from which to construct a response to the
danger of weakening employee bargaining power. In New York Univer-
sity Medical Center, the Board, while utilizing the jurisdictional stand-
ard established for a college, applied the policy against fragmenta-
in See note 72 supra.
2" Arguably, by the Board's rationale in the law school cases, separate units for
every school at a college or university could be appropriate, since each school's faculty
no doubt has a "special allegiance" to their particular discipline which transcend, at least
to some degree, their community of interest with the university faculty as a whole. For
a discussion of the law school cases, see text at notes 163-72 supra.
2" For example, if the law faculty is to be able to bargain for a separate
facility—an interest perhaps inconsistent with those of the general university
faculty—then perhaps a separate unit would be appropriate. Similarly, if part-time fac-
ulty are allowed to bargain for participation in tenure or government—an interest more
than likely inconsistent with that of the full-time faculty—then perhaps, here again, a
separate unit would be appropriate.
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tion mandated by Congress in the health care industry, and concluded
that any separate community of interest which the psychiatrists en-
joyed was largely submerged in a broader community of interests that
they shared with other physicians and (possibly) other "allied" profes-
sionals in the health care industry. 2" In the university area, the
Board's inclusion of librarians and other non-teaching professionals in
a unit with faculty is strikingly similar to its prediliction for an all-
professional unit in the health care industry.'" The Board's treatment
of law school, part-time, and visiting faculty, however, is basically in-
consistent with its treatment of the various personnel in the health
care industry. Thus, in the area of university bargaining units, the
Board, acting without the guidance of an expressed congressional pol-
icy, seems to be unsure as to what its overriding concern should be.
Because of this, the Board, while paying lip-service to the principles
of collective bargaining stability and efficiency, has opted to fragment
the university faculty unit based on what seems to be rather superfi-
cial differences in interests.
It is submitted that the Board should pay more heed to the true
nature of a university and less to surface aspects of form. A college or
university is a broad-based community of scholars, each with his or
her own area of expertise in a particular subject. Further, each schol-
ar has his own style; some are noted for research, some for a particu-
lar classroom method, others for success with grants. None can be
said to be more of a faculty member than another. Many of the fields
of teaching have special overview or certification requirements, such
as nursing, physical therapy or education; others do not. Some pro-
fessors spend a great deal of time in the classroom; others rely heavily
on teaching assistants. It would appear that when the university or
college is viewed as a collection of highly individualistic professionals
who have in common one overriding goal, the education of students,
many of the Board's criteria for unit exclusion of part-time faculty,
law faculty or principal investigators become unpersuasive in the
perspective of a scholarly, rather than an industrial, "community".
III. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ISSUES
While there is now a body of case-law on unit-determination in
the university sector, few of the issues "lurking" in the area of univer-
sity collective bargaining have as yet been litigated. The question of
what issues within the university sector should be considered manda-
tory subjects of' bargaining may become an area of conflict and confu-
sion especially in light of the prominent role faculty senates and
"' 217 N.L.R.B. at , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1049.
232 See Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 89 L.R.R.M.
1667, 1668 (1975); Mt. Airy Foundation, 217 N.L.R.B. No. 137, 89 L.R.R.M. 1067,
1068 (1975); see generally Nathan and Miriam Barnert Memorial Hospital Center, 217
N.L.R.B. No. 132, 89 L.R.R.M. 1083 (1975).
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committees presently play in the development of university policy and
procedure.
A. Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining
The distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of
bargaining is too well understood to require extensive review here. 233
To the extent that faculty have in the past participated in decisions
concerning non-mandatory subjects, the distinction between manda-
tory and permissive subjects of bargaining is important only insofar as
the relationship between faculty and administration becomes more
adversarial and less cooperative or "collegial." If the relationship be-
tween the faculty, as represented by their bargaining representative,
and the University becomes adversarial, the University could develop
a hard-lineapproach and curtail faculty input on all non-mandatory
subjects of bargaining. This would allow the faculty to provide input
only on the mandatory subjects of bargaining—"wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment." 234
(1) Wages and Hours
The scope of faculty bargaining over wages and hours should
not prove too difficult from a definitional standpoint in light of the
precedent which has evolved in the industrial sector. For example, the
Board has rejected the argument that merit increases are not manda-
tory subjects of bargaining simply because they are dependent upon
the employer's assessment of the individual employees.n 3 Similarly,
tuition remission may be likened to discounts on company products or
services—also held to be within the term "wages." 236 Other fringe
benefits, such as pension plans and insurance have long been consid-
ered "wages" for purposes of bargaining. 237
The same may be said of the factor of "hours." In the industrial
233 See generally, Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 30, 77 L.R.R.M. 2634
(9th Cir. 1971); United Electric, Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 150,
70 L.R.R.M. 2529 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also note 234 infra.
" 4 Section 8(d) of the Act, 29 C.S.C. § 158 (d) provides in part:
For the purposes of this Section, to bargain collectively is the per-
formance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative
of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
235 E.W. Scripps Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 227, 228, 28 L.R.R.M. 1033, 1034 (1951); see
also NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 745-46 (1962).
535 See, for example, NLRB v. Central III. Public Service Co., 324 F.2d 916, 918-20,
54 L.R.R.M. 2586, 2588-89 (7th Cir. 1963).
557 Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251, 22 L.R.R.M. 2506, 2510 (7th
Cir. 1948), cert. den., 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
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sector, work schedules, 238 the length of the work day 2 38 and the days
of the week an employee must work 24° have all been found to be
mandatory bargaining subjects. These subjects should remain man-
datory within the university bargaining structure, since they are basic
to any employer/employee relationship.
(2) Other Terms and Conditions of Employment
"Other terms and conditions of employment" is the area of
mandatory bargaining subjects most likely to spawn litigation. The
scope of this phrase is potentially so enormous that its boundaries are
most easily marked by outlining those subjects which are excluded as
management prerogatives. For example, in the industrial sector, an
employer cannot be required to bargain over its selection of supervi-
sory or management personnel."' Another subject long considered
the prerogative of the 'employer is the nature of the product to be
manufactured, and the manner, means and processes of
production. 242 While the boundaries of management prerogatives are
fairly well defined in the industrial sector, the question arises of
whether these or similar boundaries will serve to define "other terms
and conditions of employment" as applied to the university sector.
If unionism is to supplant the existing faculty government sys-
tem and provide the medium for faculty input into the administrative
process, the result may be that certain subjects on which the faculty
presently provide input through the faculty government structure,
may be found to be outside the scope of the phrase "conditions of
employment." Therefore, at some universities the influx of unionism
could result in a decrease in faculty input into the educational and
administrative process. Every institution, from the smallest of junior
colleges to the largest of multi-campus universities, has traditionally
functioned through relatively elaborate and complex governance sys-
tems. Committees upon committees serve to support these institutions,
providing vehicles to move the institutions along, forming the means
by which grievances are heard, identifying staffing needs, and de-
veloping curriculum. The coverage of such committees can touch
every phase of the life of a faculty member, a student, or an adminis-
trator. Permanent and ad hoc committees are formed for a vast array
of purposes—some clearly falling within the traditional parameters of
2" Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 504, 18 L.R.R.M. 1370 (1946),
enf den. on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949, 20 L.R.R.M. 2204 (6th Cir. 1947).
230
	
& Brooker Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 747, 763, 60 L.R.R.M. 1015, 1018,
(1965), turd, 373 F.2d 741, 64 L.R.R.M. 2736 (4th Cir. 1967).
240 Tim ken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 519-21, 18 L.R.R.M. 1370
(1946).
241 NLRB v. Ford Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457, 463, 42 L.R.R.M. 2620,
2624, (2d Cir. 1958).
"'See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
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the phrase "conditions of employment,"243 but many clearly beyond
that border. For example, faculty have traditionally been involved in
the selection of administrators—department chairmen, deans, presi-
dents; they have been part of budget committees advising boards of
trustees; they have formed hiring committees which identify staffing
needs, set job qualifications or, at the very least, interview and rec-
ommend new faculty members.
Technically, many of these areas—for example, selection of ad-
ministrators and determination of hiring needs and procedures—have
certainly never been considered by the Board as mandatory subjects
of bargaining.244 The university sector is unique in that a successful
faculty department largely depends upon obtaining compatible faculty
while still maintaining overall philosophical balance. Thus, the hiring
of new faculty who will work closely with the existing faculty in trying
to create a suitable learning environment is arguably a condition of
employment. However, if unionism replaces faculty government as
the primary medium of faculty input, then the Board will face both
difficult definitional problems, and the possibility of arriving at results
inconsistent with those reached in the industrial sector.
How will the Board treat such problems? At St. John's University
last year, a definitional problem arose where the school administration
refused to discuss a faculty union proposal on "governance" which in-
cluded a proposal on selection procedures for various administrators.
An unfair labor charge resulted alleging refusal to bargain over a
mandatory subject of bargaining. The charge was dismissed and an
appeal denied, on the grounds that such an area was clearly not a
mandatory subject of bargaining. Thus, the University consequently
did not have to discuss the proposal with the union.245.Further guid-
ance from the Board is needed before it will be possible to predict
how the Board will define the parameters of mandatory bargaining
subjects within the university sector. However, with many more in-
stitutions unionizing, decisions should be expected. One example of a
possible disputed subject could be the faculty's role in the budget
preparation process. Employees in a factory have nothing to do with
establishing a management's budget priorities, whereas faculty de-
partmental budget committees often assist not only the chairman but
the dean and other administrators in establishing the budget. The
issue here is whether a faculty union may insist on bargaining over
2" The Supreme Court in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203 (1964), set the traditional parameters by elaborating on what fell outside of "condi-
tions of employment."
If, as I think clear, the purpose of § 8(d) is to describe a limited area sub-
ject to the duty of collective bargaining, those management decisions which
are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or which
impinge only indirectly upon employment security should be excluded
from that area. Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
1" See text and notes at notes 241-42 supra.
245 See CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Vol. X, No. 4, at I (March 17, 1975).
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budget procedure. A second possible area of dispute could be the
faculty's relationship with the board of trustees. Faculty occasionally
serve on boards of trustees, have access to board minutes and agenda,
receive periodic reports from the board, or are allowed to submit
proposals and appear before the board. Whether a faculty union,
however, can insist upon bargaining over similar treatment remains to
be seen. 246
Commentary
"Wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment"
are words of limitation."' Thus, the fact that faculty have tradition-
ally provided input in certain areas does not automatically place those
areas within the scope of mandatory bargaining, since the Supreme
Court has held that common practice is not dispositive on the issue
of mandatory bargaining subjects but only reflects the interests of the
246 Where will other battle lines be drawn? Some topic areas suggest themselves:
I. Hiring. Traditionally faculty have had key roles in identifying the need for
new faculty within their departments and, then, varying roles in the hiring procedure
from drafting the qualifications for the position to actually making formal hiring rec-
ommendations.
2. Selection and Removal of Administrators. Again, faculty have frequently
been involved in search committees for department chairmen, deans and presidents.
They have also frequently been able to "recall" their chairmen or petition for removal
of the dean or president to the Board of Trustees. Faculty input into this area and fac-
ulty hiring is a clear example of the concept of a "community of scholars." The
dichotomies which automatically become imposed in a union setting seem particularly
alien to the "community of scholars" concept.
3. Student Affairs. Faculty unions do not represent students. But, can the ar-
gument be made that student admissions, standards and conduct are mandatory areas
of bargaining? Presumably the argument would have to rest on the fact that faculty do
most of their work with students. Yet, to put the question crudely, how is this different
from an industrial employee claiming the right to bargain over the type of machinery
he must work with?
4. Retrenchment Decisions. While it is clear that a faculty union can bargain
over retrenchment (layoff) procedures, can it also insist on bargaining over the basic
decision to retrench faculty (as opposed to saving money in some other way)? May it
bargain over the particular areas to be retrenched? While such decisions clearly affect
the faculty working conditions, will the NLRB consider it a sufficiently protected mana-
gerial prerogative?
5. Tenure. There seems little doubt that tenure will be considered to be a man-
datory subject of bargaining.
6. Peer Evaluation. Must the right of one faculty member to judge another be
negotiated in the context of bargainable areas like promotion, reappointment and ten-
ure?
7. Academic Freedom. The area of concern most unique to faculty members as
compared to employees in other industries is "academic freedom." This concept is a ral-
lying cry for oppressed professors everywhere on issues which range from denial of
tenure to treatment of students in class. But is it a "condition of employment"? Do the
parameters of academic freedom extend too far, impinging upon the right of "man-
agement" to determine the governing philosophies of the institution and its basic right
to "direct the work force"? Such questions have yet to be answered.
847 Fibreboard Paper Producti Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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employers and the employees in the subject matter. 248 It is possible,
however, that the Board will conclude that areas of traditional faculty
involvement are "terms and conditions of employment." The Board
has already taken the first step in this direction by basing its exclusion
of part-time faculty from the full-time faculty unit on their lack of
participation in governance. By reasoning that governance affects
membership in the bargaining unit, the Board has implied that gov-
ernance is a term and condition of employment, since the idea of
forming bargaining units on the basis of community of interest as-
sumes that the members of the unit have similar stakes in the terms
and conditions of employment.
Of potentially greater significance than the Board's exclusion of
part-timers is the Board's use of the concept of collegiality in denying
department chairmen supervisory status, since by applying this con-
cept to find that department chairmen are not supervisors, 249 the
Board has acknowledged the role that faculty input plays in policy
and personnel decisions within the university structure. This acknowl-
edgement could be interpreted to indicate that policy and personnel
matters are not managerial prerogatives implemented by supervisors,
but are instead terms and conditions of employment. In view of the
above, the Board may have committed a fundamental error when it
decided to enter the area of higher education through ad hoc adjudi-
cation rather than through rulemaking.. Through the adjudicative
process, the Board was forced to confront unit determination issues
before it dealt with the basic questions of distinguishing which policy
and personnel matters were within the discretion of management and
which areas were mandatory subjects of bargaining. This use of the
adjudication process may lead to such anomalous results as excluding
part-time faculty from the full-time faculty unit based, at least in part,
on the part-time faculty's non-participation in university gov-
ernance—a matter that is arguably within the purview of management
discretion.
It is submitted that regardless of the method chosen by the
Board to enter the area of university collective bargaining, the Board
should develop regulations in that area which are distinct from the
parallel regulations applied to the industrial sector. In the industrial
sector, the goal is production that ultimately will return a profit. The
control of and responsibility for implementing this goal rests with the
executives and, to some extent, lesser management personnel. By con-
trast, in the university setting, the product—education—is controlled
primarily by the production workers—the faculty. The administration
does not control the final product, but instead attempts to provide the
natural resources needed by the faculty to perform their basic educa-
tional function. Consequently, the university decision-making struc-
"8 Local 1 Allied Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157.
176 (1971).
24° See text at notes 108-10 supra.
980
UNIVERSITY REPRESENTATION
ture is set up to allow the faculty to have significant input on all ques-
tions involving the product—education. Given the significant control
over the educational product exercised by the faculty, there exists an
employer/employee relationship which is sufficiently distinct from the
one existing in the industrial sector to warrant regulations which are
different from those applied in the industrial sector. 25° Furthermore,
when faculties organize, the motive is not always economic. Such or-
ganization may stem primarily from a desire to increase faculty par-
ticipation in the decision-making process, or to preserve the faculty
against encroachment from the administration or student body.
Moreover, the Board has given some indication that it considers ftc-
ulty participation in certain of these areas to be concomitant of their
professional status.
Despite the probable confusion arising out of the creation of a
dual standard, a strict application of the industrial model of collective
bargaining to higher education could lead to some very undesirable
results. For example, by strictly applying the industrial model, the
Board would impose an adversarial structure on what is, hopefully, a
generally collegial atmosphere. This could well result in the replace-
ment of the collegial atmosphere with one of suspicion and animosity.
In light of the fundamental differences between the industrial and
university sectors, the Board should consider the ramifications of ap-
plying industrial standards of collective bargaining to the university
sector. 25 '
B. Traditional Subjects of Bargaining in the University Setting
Irrespective of the distinction between mandatory and permis-
sive subjects of collective bargaining, it is apparent that existing col-
lege contracts have covered an enormous number of topics. Three
areas of non-mandatory bargaining which have traditionally been in-
cluded in university contracts are academic freedom, hiring, and gov-
ernance. First, with respect to academic freedom, the vast majority of
all higher education collective bargaining agreements include some
type of clause on this subject. The typical provision reiterates or
paraphrases the provisions in the American Association of University
Professors' 1940 Statement, which generally provides for freedom of
research, freedom of classroom discussion, and freedom of speech
and publication. 252 However, some contracts' enlarge on the AAUP
255 Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking Through Ad-
judication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 63, 67 n.5 (1973)..
251 See generally, Pauley, Collective Bargaining on Campus: Reflections on The U.R.I.
Experience (Address given at University of Vermont, Stowe, Vt., August 21, 1975);
Comment, Collective Bargaining By University and College Faculties Under the NLRA, 36
Onto Si'. L.J. 71 (1975)
252 The AAUP's 11140 statement provides in part: Academic Freedom
"(a) The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the
results, subject to the adequate performance of his other academic duties; but research
for pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of
the institution.
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Statement and apply the academic freedom concept to such factors as
speakers on campus 'and political activities of faculty,253 and campus
disorders.254 Second, while the dispute may continue about whether
(b) The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, but he
should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no
relation to his subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other
aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appoint-
ment.
(c) The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned profession,
and an officer of an educational institution. When he speaks or writes as a citizen, he
should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position in the
community imposes special obligations. As a man of learning and an educational of-
ficer, he should remember that the public may judge his profession and his institution
by his utterances. Hence, he should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate
restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort
to indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman.
Statement of Principles of Academic Freedom, taken from Faculty Tenure: A Report and
Recommendations by the Commission on Academie Tenure in Higher Education, 249 (1973).
253 Agreement between Rhode Island Board of Regents and Rhode Island Col-
lege Chapter, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Local #I819, 1975-77
ARTICLE III: ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. Academic Freedom
r *
3.3 Faculty may freely select the persons they wish to invite to the cam-
pus as guest speakers. There shall be no restricitons to control the views
expressed by speakers other than those imposed by state and national
***
B. "'arnica( Activity
3.5 The College faculty member is a citizen and, like other citizens,
should be free to engage in political activities so far as he/she is able to do
so consistently with his/her obligations as a faculty member.
3.6 Many kinds of political activity (e.g., holding pan-time office in a
political party, seeking election to any office under circumstances that do
not require extensive campaigning, or serving by appointment or election
in a part-time political office) are consistent with effective service as a
member of a faculty. Other kinds of political activity (e.g., intensive cam-
paigning for elective office, serving in a state legislature, or serving a lim-
ited term in a full-time position) will often require that the faculty member
seek a leave of absence from the College.
3.7 A leave of absence incident to political activity should, when practica-
ble, come under the College's normal rules and regulations for leaves of
absence without pay.
Agreement between the Board of Trustees of State Colleges and The Worces-
ter State College Faculty Federation Local 2070, American Federation of Teachers,
AFL-CIO (September 28, 1972)
ARTICLE V: STATEMENT ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY
... Institutions of higher education are committed to the solution of prob-
lems and controversies by the method of rational discussion. Acts of physi-
cal force or disruptive acts which interfere with college activities, freedom
of movement on the campus, or freedom for students to pursue their
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faculty hiring is a mandatory subject of bargaining, many contracts al-
ready reflect the fact that bargaining takes place in this area. The
primary concern of the faculty in the hiring area, as reflected by the
provisions in various contracts, seems to be that appointments be
made primarily on the basis of recommendations submitted to the
dean by the faculty. 255 Third, the term "governance" can assume
many meanings in the academic milieu. Most contracts do not have a
specific "governance" provision; however, "governance" defined in
terms of faculty involvement in running the institution and providing
input on personnel decisions can be found in various sections of vir-
tually all contracts. While some contracts are very specific about the
governance process and set out not only the structure of the govern-
ment but also the scope of that government's function, 256 others do
studies are the antithesis of academic freedom and responsibility as are
acts which in effect deny freedom of speech, freedom to be heard and
freedom to pursue research of their own choosing to members of the
academic community or to invited visitors to that community
222 The Roger Williams College Faculty Association 1973-1975 Contract with the
Board of Trustees:
ARTICLE VIII
APPOINTMENT AND EVALUATION
A. Appointment— Initial faculty contracts shall be issued by the
Academic Dean from recommendations submitted by members of the
academic area and the Division through the Division coordinators to whose
division the appointment will be made. Initial contracts for librarians,
counselors and Directors of Learning Laboratories shall be issued by the
Academic Dean based upon the recommendations of the existing profes-
sional staff.
236 Agreement between The Board of Trustees of State Colleges and The Wor-
cester State College Faculty Federation Local 2070, American Federation of Teachers,
AFL-CIO (September 28, 1972)
ARTICLE VII
PARTICIPATION IN DECISION MAKING
A. The All College Council: Membership and Responsibility
• * *
2. Responsibilities of the All College Council
The Council shall be the primary agency for coordinating and im-
plementing the system of the tripartite i governance set forth in the provi-
sions of this Agreement. Accordingly, the Council shall encourage the par-
ticipation of all members of the College faculty and student body in the
processes of decision making.
The Council shall (a) receive from its Standing or Ad-hoc Commit-
tees all reports and recommendations! for review by the Council; and,
within thirty (30) days of the receipt of any such reports or recommenda-
tions from any of its Committees, the Council shall, without exception,
transmit such reports or recommendations to the Academic Dean and to
the President of the College, together with any comment or recommenda-
tions of its own. Accordingly, all recommendations from the Committees
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little more than state the problem. 257
One possible explanation for this extensive coverage of non-
mandatory subjects of bargaining in collective bargaining contracts is
that some institutions, particularly small colleges and junior colleges,
leap into collective bargaining without experienced counsel. Certainly
a small school whose twenty or thirty faculty members form a local
unaffiliated union may feel little need to expend money on labor rela-
tions counsel. Indeed, the attitude may be that the faculty have simply
opted for a new governance format. Such institutions, obviously, are
not aware of their rights to refuse to discuss certain topic areas with
their unionized faculty. Where there is a tendency before unionization
to treat faculty as part of the governing group of the college, the
tendency will likely remain after unionization, thus leading to a type
of bargaining which is unmindful of the distinctions between mandat-
of the Council shall be made to the Council through the appropriate ad-
ministrative officer as set forth in this Agreement. The Council shall re-
view all such recommendations and shall make every effort to resolve any
conflicts and differences in Committee recommendations prior to transmit-
ting such Committee recommendations to the Dean and the President
within the thirty (30) day period aforesaid; (b) prepare and develop by
May 1, 1973, for use within each department, new procedures and forms,
including any appropriate questionnaire, for obtaining student evaluation
of both the teaching performance of faculty members and of the courses
taught by faculty; (c) make any assignment to any of its Committees consis-
tent with the duties of such Committee as set forth hereafter in this
Agreement; (d) review and study education matters relating to the in-
terests and objectives of the College and make proposals thereon to the
President of the College; and (e) accept for study any matter submitted to
it by the President of the College.
2" Agreement between Long Island University and the United Federation of
College Teachers Local 1460-American Federation of Teachers-AFL-C10, The Brook-
lyn Center (September 1974).
ARTICLE IV
GOVERNANCE
The Union and the Employer understand that, except for collective
bargaining regarding terms and conditions of employment which is within
the exclusive purview of the Brooklyn Center Chapter of the United Fed-
eration of College Teachers (UFCT), the governance of the Brooklyn
Center may involve other constituencies and modes of consultation and
decision-making in addition to those cited in this Agreement.
Both parties will encourage the pluralism in governance represented
by bodies appointed by the Administration, or elected from the Faculty,
Students and Alumni, and will support cooperative interaction of such
groups to aid in the effective functioning of the Brooklyn Center. The
Union may petition any such body for the privilege of observing and pre-
senting matters for consideration.
Both parties will especially consider the inherent interests of stu-
dents, alumni, and community; furthermore, both parties will use their
best efforts to maintain and foster their participation in the conduct of the
affairs of the Brooklyn Center.
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ory and permissive subjects of bargaining which are applied in the
industrial sector.
A second possible explanation for the broad scope of faculty
bargaining lies in university administration decisions to treat all deal-
ings with the faculty under one umbrella. Trying to separate manda-
tory from non-mandatory topic areas may seem a waste of time to an
institution that intends to deal with the faculty in all areas of college
life. Yet another reason for this broad scope is simply union pressure.
An administration faced with a strong, united faculty union which
proposes discussions at the table on a wide range of topics may
scarcely be in a position to insist on its right to refuse to bargain over
what it considers "non-mandatory areas" but which the faculty view as
falling within their traditional rights. In any event, it seems likely that
faculty contracts will continue to reflect this expansive approach to
bargaining—at least until some decisions are made by the Board "of-
ficially" delineating the range of mandatory subjects.
IV. OTHER ISSUES
A. Labor Organizations
(1) Faculty Senates As Labor Organizations
One of several as yet unexamined problems in the area of
higher education is the status of faculty senates and committees under
Section 2(5) of the Act.'" Section 8(a)(2) makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer: "to dominate or interfere with the forma-
tion or administration of any labor organization or contribute finan-
cial or other support to IC 259 In Section 2(5) a "labor organization" is
defined to include any organization or employee representation com-
mittee which is created, at least in part, to deal with employee "griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
conditions of work." 20° As construed by the Board and courts, this
language is sufficiently broad to cover various faculty bodies. 261 If a
group of employees deals with the employer on any one of the topics
listed in Section 2(5), the group is likely to be considered a labor
organization. 202 It must be noted, of course, that "dealing with" is
25 ° 29 U.S.C.	 152(5) (1970).
259 29 U.S.C.	 158(a) (2) (1970).
26° Section 2(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970) defines a labor organization
as:
[A]ny organization of any king or any agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or condi-
tions of work,
261 For an argument to the contrary, see Finkin, The NLRB in Higher Education, 5
U. TOL L. REV. 608, 645 (1974).
262 NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 210-14 (1959).
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broader than "bargaining with."2" An employee organization "deals
with" management when it makes recommendations, or even when it
submits an opinion without specific recommendations.264 Thus, since
a faculty senate clearly has "dealings with" the university concerning
conditions of employment, the Board could find it to be a labor or-
ganization. However, due to the virtual identity of the topics listed in
Section 2(5) with those within the scope of mandatory bargaining
under the Act, it is possible to argue that an organization which deals
with the employer only on non-mandatory subjects would not qualify
as a "labor organization."265 The only representation case in which the
issue of a faculty body as a labor organization has been raised is
Northeastern University.266 In that case the Board held that the faculty
senate was not a labor organization, since it functioned only as an ad-
visory committee, making recommendations, which the Board found
were totally different from bargaining demands made by a union dur-
ing contract negotiations.264 Such a result is startling in the face of a
massive body of the Board's own precedent to the contrary, which
provides that the statutory definition of a labor organization is met
even if the organization at issue only submits recoinmendations.268
263 Id.
NLRB v. Thompson Ramo Wooldrige, Inc., 305 F.2d 807, 810, 50 L.R.R.M.
2759, 2761 (7th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. j.H. Matthews & Co., 156 F.2d 706, 707-08, 18
L.R.R.M. 2264, 2266 (3d Cir. 1946).
- 2" This position finds support in a statement by the Board in Wrought Iron
Range Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 487,22 L.R.R.M. 1050 (1948):
Moreover, while the Board will not interfere with the legitimate functions
of bona fide committees devoted eiclusively to management objectives, it
has held that organizations established ostensibly for such purposes may,
nevertheless, be found to be labor organizations. Id. at 489, 22 L.R.R.M. at
1051.
266 218 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 89 L.R.R.M. 1862 (1975). The employer challenged the
union's petition asserting that the faculty senate already represented a labor organiza-
tion. Id. at , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1865.
"'Id. at 	 , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1865. The Board found that the faculty senate had
the following functions:
"1. To act as a co-ordinating body to establish mutually satisfactory academic
goals and standards among various Colleges and Division.
2. To be consulted either as a whole body or in appropriate committee on all
policies, proposals, and problems of faculty concern, including such matters as the crea-
tion of new colleges, new campuses and new departments.
3. To initiate consideration and recommendation on any matter of faculty con-
cern.
4. To undertake such legislative and advisory functions in connection with the
work of the University as may be referred to it by the President and Board of Trustees.
5. To provide communication between the Administration and University Fac-
ulty."
Id.
2" E.g., Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. 324, 75 L.R.R.M. 1349 (1970), where
the Board, prior to ruling on the issue of employer domination of an employee com-
mittee, found that committee to be a "labor organization":
Although it is true the Committee did not bargain with the Respond-
ent in the usual concept of collective bargaining and the proposals made
by 'The Committee possibly amounted only to recommendations, the fact
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The decision merits prompt speculation whether the Board will
adhere to its prior decisions in cases arising in the industrial sector,
while it follows Northeastern in college cases.
(2) Employer Domination
If the faculty senate is classified as a labor organization, then the
problems of Section 8(a)(2) employer interference or domination will
immediately surface. Domination represents a degree of support and
interference sufficient to result in control of the labor organization,
while interference is generally viewed as only employer assistance to
the labor organization. 2" It has been clearly established that both
domination and interference are distinct unfair practices; 27° however,
the distinction between these two practices is an important one, since
the remedy for domination is disestablishmentm while the remedy
for interference is only the withholding of Board recognition until the
organization is certified by the Board as the collective bargaining rep-
resentative of their employees. 272
remains that The Commitee dealt with the Respondent concerning
employee 's complaints. This demonstrates that The Corninittee was a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act ....
Id. at 334. See also Sea Life, Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 982, 984-85, 71 L.R.R.M. 1134, 1138
(1969): ./ansen Electronics Mfg., Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 1555, 1556-58, 59 L.R.R.M. 1750
(1965); Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 993, 995, 48 L.R.R.M. 1470,
1470, (1961).
269 Hershey Metal Products Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 695, 696-97, 21 L.R.R.M. 1237
(1948). This assistance may be found where the acquiescence, its the use of his em-
ployee lists or allows union organizational activities during the work day without dock-
ing the participants for the time involved.
" "'E.g., NLRB v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 419 F.2d 1080, 1082, 72 L.R.R.M. 2972,
2974 (1st Cir. 1969); Hershey Metal Products Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 695, 696-98, 21
L.R.R.M. 1237 (1948); Carpenter Steel Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 670, 673, 21 L.R.R.M. 1232,
1233 (1948).
"' Carpenter Steel Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 670, 671, 21 L.R.R.M. 1232, 1233 (1948). A
disestablished labor organization can never be certified by the Board. Id.
m Id. In general, to avoid a charge of interference or domination, an employer
must refrain from participation in the formation and administration of the labor or-
ganization, so that the organization may be the product of the employees' free choice.
See Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630, 87 L.R.R.M. 2503, 2506-07 (9th
Cir. 1974); and Wahlgren Magnetics, 132 N.L.R.B. 1613, 1619-20, 48 L.R.R.M. 1542
(1961). The employer is entitled, however, both to suggest the 1brmation of an em-
ployees' council and to state a preference for dealing with the council rather than an
outside union-so long as the form, nature and functions of the council are determined
by the employees themselves. Hertzka & Knowles, 503 F.2d at 630-31, 87 L.R.R.M. at
2506-07. The Circuit Courts, however, have drawn a distinction between illegal em-
ployer assistance and "cooperation." In several cases involving employer assistance,
where the organization was independent of employer domination and there was history
of anti-union activity on the part of the employer, the courts have refused to enforce
Board orders based on Section 8(a) (1) and Section 8(a) (2). See, ftw example, Hertzka &
Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630-31, 87 L.R.R.M. 2503, 2506-07 (9th Cir. 1974);
Copps Engineering Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564, 39 L.R.R.M. 2315, 2320-21 (1st Cir.
1957); Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 169-71, 35 L.R.R.M. 2665,
2666-69 (7th Cir. 1955). The Board has now accepted the distinction, see Coatuo Knit-
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In addition to prohibiting domination and interference, Section
8(a)(2) prohibits direct and indirect financial support of a labor or-
ganization by the employer. Evidence of such support can be found in
the employer's free allowance of its facilities, 273 including bulletin
ting Mills, 150 N.L.R.B. 579, 582-83, 58 L.R.R.M. 1116, 1117-18 (1964); Manuela Mfg.
Co., Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 379, 385, 53 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1963), although it remains suspi-
cious of employer assistance and still occasionally finds that forms of assistance are vio-
lative of Section 8(a) (2). In Duquesne University, 198 N.L.R.B. 891, 81 L.R.R.M. 1091
(1972), the employees, at the employer's suggestion, had formed an "employee commit-
tee" which dealt with the employer on specific issues and individual grievances. The
committee did not, however, negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement. The
committee had no constitution or by-laws, collected no dues, and had no treasury. At
the employer's suggestion, the employee committee established a grievance committee.
In April 1971, Teamsters Local 249 initiated an organizing campaign at the University.
After Local 249 filed election petitions covering two different units of employees, the
employer's personnel director suggested that the employee committee needed a lawyer,
and proposed a certain attorney. The Committee retained the attorney as its counsel. In
May 1971 the employee committee began soliciting authorization cards from employees.
Thereupon, unfair labor practice charges were filed against the employer.
The Trial Examiner found for the complainants, basing his findings of unlawful
assistance and support on the following: the committee collected no dues and had no
treasury; the committee met on University premises; committee members were not
docked for time spent at meetings; ballots for committee elections were printed at the
University's expense and distributed through the University's mail; elections were con-
ducted on the University's time; and the committee's weekly newspaper was printed at
the University's expense and distributed through the University's mail. Id. at 891, 81
L.R.R.M. at 1092.
The Board, however, said it would not find such evidence alone to be sufficient
to find a violation of Section 8(a) (2). The Board considered the case to present "special
circumstances" "... where an employer, here a university, so freely makes available its
facilities, time, and services to any desirous organization, including to some extent,
other labor organizations." Id. Such assistance would be no more than "friendly cooper-
ation" said the Board, were it not for other "unusual indicia of intent:" the personnel
director gave advice and counsel to the employee committee, and helped it select a
lawyer; a Staff Relations Committee, dissolved at the insistence of the employee com-
mittee and the employer's vice-president, had attempted to act as advisor to the em-
ployee committee after the Staff Relations Committee had been dissolved. Id. at 891-92,
81 L.R.R.M. at 1092-93. Noting that there was no convincing evidence that the Com-
mittee involved represented an uncoerced majority of nonexempt employees, the Board
found that these "unusual indicia of intent" represented interference within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a) (2) and (1). Id. at 892, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1093.
Unlike the Trial Examiner, however, the Board refused to find illegal domina-
tion. While the Employer has the implicit power to transfer, promote or discharge the
employees' representatives, the Board said, this amounted to no more than a potential
for domination, and had been found to be evidence of domination only in those cases,
unlike the present case where the organization had been formulated and structured by
the employer. Id. at 892-93, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1093-94. Accordingly, the Board ordered
the employer to withdraw and withhold recognition of the employee committee until
and unless it was certified, and to withhold all unlawful support and assistance and re-
frain from acting in an advisory capacity to the committee, but refused to order dises-
tablishment. Id. at 893, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1094. See also Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 219
N.L.R.B. No. 85, 89 L.R.R.M. 1879 (1975), where Members Fanning and Jenkins, dis-
senting in part, would have ordered disestablishment in that case.
273 Tuscarora Plastics Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 1059, 1059-60, 66 L.R.R.M. 1229, 1230
(1967).
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boards,274
 and company time. 272
 Thus, if a faculty senate is found to
be a labor organization, the Board is again likely to be faced with
either seriously crippling the university's collegial atmosphere by plac-
ing rigid, formal requirements on the interaction of the faculty senate
and the administration, or once again attempting to create a univer-
sity standard different from the one applied in the industrial sector.
However, since the doctrine of domination is statutory, the Board is
ultimately left relatively little flexibility or choice if the outside labor
organization or any other disgruntled "person" under the Act chooses
to assert that illegal assistance has been rendered to the senate or any
of its committees. Thus, the Board, in fact, may not be able to create
a different standard of domination for the university should it find
the faculty senate to be a "labor organization."
B. Exclusivity
Even before Cornell was decided commentators, speculating on
the ramifications of collective bargaining in higher education, saw the
principle of exclusivity as one which posed a serious threat to faculty
governance structure."° The exclusivity principle states that once a
bargaining representative has been certified, the employer may not
negotiate with its employees other than through that
representative: 277
 "The obligation [to bargain) being exclusive ... it
exacts 'the negative duty to treat with no other.'" 222 The question
here, as under the previous discussion dealing with Section 8(a)(2), is
whether this prohibition is limited to "bargaining" as opposed to
"dealing with," and if so, whether the functions of the various faculty
bodies fall within the prohibition.
As noted above, the faculty senate and various faculty commit-
tees "deal with" the employer on a wide variety of subjects, some of
which are clearly mandatory subjects of bargaining and others of
which are not. The principle of exclusivity, however, does not depend
on the presence of a second labor organization, for an employer vio-
lates the Act if he bargains with a single employee rather than the ex-
clusive bargaining agent. The question, therefore, becomes whether
exclusivity is violated if an employer "deals with" but does not bargain
with someone other than the exclusive bargaining representative. If
the resolution of this issue is struck in favor of the broader of the two
phrases, there may be significant practical repercussions. Would an
274 Webb Mfg., Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 827, 832, 60 L.R.R.M. 1041, 1042 (1965).
272 Kimbrell v. NLRB, 290 F.2d 799, 802, 48 L.R.R.M. 2310, 2312 (4th Cir.
1961).
2713 E.g. Elan, & Moskow Employment Relations in Higher Education, 81 PHI DELTA
KAPPA 67, 134 (1969); Brown, Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 67 MICH. L. REV.
1067, 1075-76 (1969).
277 Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking Through Ad-
judication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 63, 157 (1973).
272 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683 (1944).
989
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
employer, for example, be able to continue to accept recommenda-
tions from the faculty once a union has been certified, without falling
afoul of the principle of exclusivity2229
The Board, with the exception of Member Kennedy, has re-
mained stubbornly silent on this subject's° In Northeastern University,
the issue was raised by the University which contended that the fac-
ulty members could not make an informed choice whether to accept
the petitioner as bargaining representative unless they were made
aware of the effect such representation would have on the continued
viability of faculty committees.28' Member Kennedy, concurring in
part and dissenting in part, stated that, in his view, the Board would
be statutorily required to apply the principle of exclusive representa-
tion should the issue be raised by the faculty representative and,
therefore, there existed the possibility that the existing university gov-
ernment structure would be drastically altered. However, Kennedy
noted that the union might be willing to leave certain matters to the
existing government structure, but in either case, the issue would have
to be resolved at the bargaining table.282
It is significant that to date only one union has reportedly filed a
charge claiming a violation of the principle of exclusivity.2" It ap-
pears from this paucity of complaints that at most institutions, faculty
bodies enjoy continuing viability as the result of the permissive at-
titude of the incumbent labor organization. However, with the con-
tinued rise in unionism in the university sector, the possibility of the
replacement of the collegial atmosphere with an adversarial one be-
comes more immediate. If an adversarial atmosphere does evolve
from the influence of unionism, then such issues as exclusivity will
have to be faced and resolved by the Board. Again, since the doctrine
of exclusivity is statutorily mandated, the Board must give full force
and effect to a union's certification as representative where the union
wishes to assert the full extent of its rights, and where it does not
choose to parcel out some of its bargaining authority to the faculty
senate or faculty committees.
CONCLUSION
Both the Board and practitioners must still face a myriad of
problems in the area of college and university collective bargaining.
The basic issue of what jurisdictional standard the Board will apply in
288 See Kahn, supra, note 277, at 157.
2110 "We have not been asked to pass on these lurking issues and, in any event,
would not do so in the context of a representation proceeding." Adelphi Univ., 195
N.L.R.B. at 648 n.31, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1556 n.31. The Board reiterated this position in
Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. at , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1866.
281 218 N.L.R.B. at , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1873.
263 The AFT leveled such a charge against the University of Vermont for dealing
with its Faculty Senate. See Case No 1-CA-9852 (Oct. 31, 1974). Recently, another
union has followed suit. See 91 Labor Relations Reporter 12 (BNA, Jan. 5, 1976).
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deciding whether to assert jurisdiction over colleges and universities
remains clouded although the recent decisions of Howard University
and University of Vermont suggest that the Board will apply its Cornell
University approach in all situations except where state intervention aft
fects the university's handling of its labor relations. The area of unit
determinations within the university sector also remains confused as
the Board seems unsure of what its overriding concern should be.
The result of this uncertainty arguably has been the unwarranted
fragmentation of the university faculty unit. Moreover, underlying
much of the confusion surrounding university collective bargaining is
the Board's failure to provide guidelines as to which policy and per-
sonnel matters are within the discretion of management and which
are mandatory subjects of bargaining. In light of the fact that the
Board has now spent some five years hearing university representa-
tion cases, it should at last have the expertise to give clear and consis-
tent guidance; however, the Board, in establishing these much needed
guidelines, should remain alert to the possible undesirable results that
could occur should the Board attempt strictly to apply the industrial
model of collective bargaining to higher education.
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